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1.  INTRODUCTION  AND  SUMMARY 
1.1  As  soon as it became  clear to  Europeans  that  the  recession born  in the mid-
seventies was  going  to be  severe  and  protracted,  some  of  them  became  concerned 
with  the  prospects  for redistributing work  over people  so  ~s  to  reduce  the 
extent of involuntary unemployment,  i.e. with  the  prospects  for work  sharing. 
That  was  not  an innovation.  A similar concern had  arisen in the  thirties, leading 
to  the dramatic unsuccessful  attempt by  the Front  Populaire  to  impose  abruptly a 
40  hours  week  in  France.  (See  for  instance,  Economie  Europeenne  (1980)  and 
Fontaine  (1984)  for  a  summary  account  of  that earlier development.  Average  weekly 
hours  in French manufacturing did not  come  down  to  the  40  hours  target until .•• 
1982!) 
In recent years,  a  number  of policy measures  designed  to  promote  work  sharing 
have  been  implemented  in European countries,  and  several reports  have  attempted 
to  asses  their  impact;  see,  for  instance Van  Den  Bergh  and  Wittelsbur~er  (1981), 
Hart  (1984)  or  Commissariat  General  du  Plan  (1985). 
The  overall  impression conveyed by  these reports  is one  of  limited effectiveness 
of work-sharing measures  in reducing unemployment  - at least if one  goes  by herd 
evidence.  (See  also Part II below.)  Also,some  authoritative voices  asserted  that 
these  measures  are misdirected  and  bound  to be self-defeating;  see  Layard  et al. 
(1984). 
Yet,  with  unemployment  rates  among  the  young ·reaching  25  % or more  in several 
European countries  and  no  major  improvement  in sight  (Cfr  European  Economy, 
November  1984,  Table  8,  p.  16),  it is understandable  that motivations  to bring 
about  some  degree  of work  sharing should persist. 
The  present paper  is not  meant  to  replicate  the  existing collective reports, 
but rather  to  provide  an appraisal  of  the  recent  European experience,  and  of  the 
prospects  for  work  sharing,  in the light of  the modern microeconomic  analysis  of 
labour  contracts.  This  calls  for  some  theoretical considerations(Part  I)  before 
turning  to  the  evidence  (Part II),  and  I  must  beg  readers  to  endure  the  detour. 
A brief  summary  of  the  arguments  may  serve  the  dual  purpose of providing  the 
patient readers with markers,  and  the  less patient or less  interested readers 
with  an  excuse  for  jumping  to  the  conclusions,  or discarding  the  paper altogether
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1.2  To  begin with  (Section 2),  I  shall  argue  that most  people  attach a  positive 
value  to having  a  "regular  job"  (as  opposed  to  a  "casual  job",  or  no  job at all). 
Within  the  context of  regular  jobs,  their  sup~ly of  hours  and  effort obeys  the 
standard neoclassical  assumptions.  There  are  substantial variations  across -2-
individuals,  and  for given individuals  over  time,  in the value of a  job  and  in 
the  supply  of hours.  From  the viewpoint ot business  firms,  "regular  jobs'' are 
the  typically preferred form of  employment.  But  the provision of  such  jobs  entails 
fixed hiring costs  (of screening,  training and  long-term commitments).  Also,  the 
provision of  these  jobs  requires  the  existence of working posts,  and  the  expecta-
tion of continued  need  for  the additional  employee,  hence  of  continued  output 
demand.  Accordingly,  the provision  (supply)  of regular  jobs  is inelastic to  their 
short-run cost. 
Next  (Section 3),  I  shall argue  that short-run disequilibria on  the  markets 
for  regular  jobs  can occur,  can  sometimes  become  sizeable and  are subject  to self-
aggravating  tendencies.  In such  situations  (well  illustrated by  present circumstan-
ces),  the resorption of disequilibrium can be  very  slow.  It would  be  both undesirable 
and  unrealistic to rely  on wage  flexibility alone  to clear labour markets  in the 
short  run. 
The  theory  of "implicit labour contracts" explains why  the wages  of  employees 
on  regular  jobs  remain downward  rigid in periods  of slack demand  for  labour. 
Quantity  adjustment~ take place,  preferably in the  form  of partial unemployment 
or temporary  layoffs,  which  combine  labour hoarding by  firms  with  some  degree of 
work  sharing among  the  employees  under  contract.  New  entrants  to  the  labour market 
are not part to  these  arrangements,  however.  There  is no  market  mechanism whereby 
work  could be  redistributed efficiently between workers  under  contract  and  newcomers. 
In addition,  the  effectiveness  of preexisting contracts  requires  a  degree of 
rigidity for  the wages  specified  in new  contracts  as  well.  And  the  fixed  costs  of 
new  hirings,  coupled with rigidities  in the organisation of work,  stand  in the way 
of work  sharing among  newcomers  in the  form of part-time  employment.  There  results 
an inefficient allocation of regular  jobs,  from  which many  newcomers  (in particular 
the  young)  are left out.  Special measures  are needed  to  correct  that inefficiency 
(Section 4). 
The  scope  for  special measures  is based  on  three  considerations  (Section 5). 
First,  there are externalities,  the most  obvious  of  them being  the  unemployment 
compensation,  which  is a  cost  to  society but not  to  individual  agents.  Second, 
there are  complex  legal provisions,  which may  or may  not  facilitate work  sharing. 
Third,  there are many  "public  good"  aspects  to  the  organisation of working  time, 
providing  scope  for  leadership  through  public policy. -3-
After  a  brief interlude  (Section 6),  which offers  a  normative  alternative  to 
Part I,  I  turn at last to  the  record  (Part II).  Selected  fragments  of  evidence 
from  various  sources  are organised  under  three headings: 
(i)  Trading  jobs,  i.e.  replacing a  worker  under  contract by  a  newcomer 
(Section  7) :  there is scope for  such  replacements  to  the extent  that  the value of 
a  job varies widely over  individuals;  the most  obvious  measure  calls for  early 
retirement  (voluntary)  with mandatory  replacement;  measures  of  that kind  have 
been  introduced  in several  countries,  pulling large  numbers  of workers  out  of  the 
labour  force;  although hard  figures  on  new  hirings  are  scanty,  those which  exist 
reveal  a  large measure  of  success  when  but only when  replacement  is mandatory; 
this  is  the  easiest  form  of work  sharing;  but more  detailed work  remains  needed 
to  quantify  prospects,  both  numberwise  and  costwise. 
(ii) Sharing  jobs;  this can  take  two  forms  (Section 8): 
(a)  a  worker  under  contract is replaced by  a  newcomer  on a  part-time basis 
(typically half-time);  measures  to  that effect have  been  introduced  in some 
countries,  with negligible effects; still, surveys  suggest substantial potential 
interest in progressive retirement  schemes; 
(b)  newcomers  are hired on a part-time basis,  so  that a  single working post 
is filled by  more  than one  person;  this  is  in principle easier,  since no  worker 
under  contract is  involved;  measures  facilitating part-time  employment  have  been 
taken in some  countries,  and hirings  of public servants  on an  80  %basis have 
been introduced  in the  Benelux countries;  there  is no  indication of  growth  in 
part-time work  by  men;  the  growth  for  women  is concentrated in those  countries 
which  are  lagging behind in this  respect,  and  reflects  a  trend  towards  greater 
accommodation of worker  preferences  rather  than  a  cyclical pattern.  One  specific 
difficulty with  job  sharing seems  to arise  from rigidities  in the organisation 
of working  schedules,  which  stand  in the way  of part-time early retirement  and 
of part-time contracts  on  a  75  % or  80  % basis.  This  is  the  area where  innova-
tive measures,  difficult as  they  may  be,  seem  to offer the greatest challenge. 
Additional  data  on  part-time work  in Europe  are  collected in the Appendix. 
(iii)  TPading  hours  for  jobs~  i.e.  reducing  weekly~r annua~ working  time 
for workers  under  contract  in order  to  create  new  jobs  (Section 9):  this  is  the 
most  controversial measure;  it is also  a  difficult one,  because  large  numbers  of -4-
workers  under  contract are  involved,  and  because  the  measure  interferes with  the 
organisation of work;  more  significantly,  firms  engaged  in labour hoarding will 
not hire additional  employees  in response  to  reductions  in hours,  whereas  ex-
uanding  firms will resist such  reductions;  the  short-run elasticity of  emoloyment 
with respect  to hours  worked  is probably very  small,  and  we  know  very little about 
the  long-run elasticity.  There  is no  clear evidence of  promisin~ prospects  along 
this  line,  outside of  isolated situations  (like continuous  operation with 
multiple shifts). 
In conclusion,  both short-run and  long-run policy prospects  are  evaluated 
(Section 10). 
1.3  The  summary  just given indicates  that the paper  covers  a  broad range of issues. 
Length  considerations will force me  .to deal  with  some  of  these  issues very briefly. 
In particular,  aspects well  covered  in accessible documents  (like implicit contracts 
theory)  will be  treated summarily2 •  Also,  I  shall refrain from  any  peripheral 
developments.  This  is not  a  paper on  employment  policies  in general,  but specific-
ally on  work  sharing.  Thus,  the  issues of  the  trade-off between work  sharing and 
other measures,  or between employment  and other objectives  (like price stability), 
are not  taken up.  This  is not belittle their significance.  Promotin~ overall 
employment  through  an adequate  combination of supply-side  and  demand  management 
measures  remains  the first priority,  in the  light of the present essay. -5-
PART  1:  THEORY  (WHY?) 
2.  REGULAR  JOBS 
2.1  The  distinction between the total number  of hours worked  and  the  number  of 
persons  employed  is  now  part of  any  serious discussion of  labour use  and  employment 
(OECD  1983,  1985).  It has  also found  its way  progressively into  econometric practice 
(see Fair,  1969,  for an early account).  The  relevance  of  the distinction is brought 
out by  the  figures  on hours  worked  per person,  which  reveal  a  steady decline,  both 
in the  long  run and  in the  recent past  (Tables  1  and  2). 
The  same  distinction is relevant at the microeconomic  level,  both on  the side 
of  labour  supply by  households  and  on  the  side of  labour demand  by  firms;  at that 
level,  it is also usefully coupled with  the distinction between "regular  jobs" and 
"casual  jobs",  as  already developed  in some  detail by  Hicks  in The  Theory  of Wages 
(1932,  63-74). 
By  a  "regular  job" is meant  an employment  relationship that is expected by both 
parties  to  have  some  stability and  to ·extend over such  duration as  circumstances 
will permit,  with neither party  forcing  termination whimsically.  The  stability may 
be  guaranteed  through  an explicit contract;  due  to  the difficulty of covering 
enough  relevant contingencies  in formal  terms,  the  typical  contract will be  largely 
implicit and  rely on accepted  norms  of behaviour,  to which both  parties are  expected 
to  conform. 
"Regular  jobs" are  opposed  to "casual  jobs",  which  carry no  expectation of 
stability.  The  latter are  fully  defined by  the  performance of a  specific task over 
a  specific time  span  (typically,  a  short span),  against  a  given wage.  Neither party 
commits  itself, not  even implicitly,  to continue  the relationship. 
There  are many  cogent  reasons  why  regular  jobs are  a  superior  form  of  employment 
relationship,  from  the viewpoint of  tiri!'s  and  ~11orkers  alike.  Relevant  considerations 
include  the  following: 
(i)  Most  jobs are performed better with  the benefit of experience,  including 
some  experience  specific to  the workplace  itself; when  the  job  involves 
team work,  the experience  is an attribute of  the  team,  and  needs  to be  rebuilt 
whenever  a  member  of  the  team  is replaced. . 
(2) 
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Year  Men  Women  All workers 
1891  153  51  102 
1911  146  46  96 
1921  130  39  84 
1931  126  41  83 
1951  118  40  79 
1961  113  40  76 
1971  100  40  69 
1981  88  40  64 
TABLE  1.  Life hours of work  in the  United  Kingdom  (thousands) 
Source  :  P.J.  Armstrong,  Technical  Change  and Reductions in 
Life Hours  of Work,  London,  The  Technical  Change 
Centre,  1984. 
1890  1913  1929  1950  1970 
Austria  2  760  2  580  2  281  1  976  1  848 
Belgium  2  789  2  605  2  272  2  283  1  986 
Canada  2  789  2  605  2  399  1  967  1  805 
France  2  770  2  588  2  297  1  989  1  888 
Germany  2  765  2  584  2  284  2  316  1  907 
Italy 
Japan 
Sweden 
United 
United 
Median 
2  714  2  536  2  228  I  997  1  768 
2  770  2  588  2  364  2  272  2  252 
2  770  2  588  2  283  1  951  1 660 
Kingdom  2  807  2  624  2  286  1  958  1  735 
States  2  789  2  605  2  342  1  867  1  707 
2  770  2  588  2  285  1  982  1  825 
TABLE  2.  Annual  hourB  UJo1~7<ed per  persor:.  1890--:.979  ---- ~---------
Sq~£ce  A Maddison,  Phases of Capitalist  Development, 
Oxford  University Press,  1982. 
1979 
I  660 
1  747 
1  730 
1  727 
1  719 
-
2  129 
1  451 
1  617 
1  607 
1  690 -7-
(ii)  Most  firms  are  complex organisations,  where  individual workers  stand 
in relationship with many  other members  of  the  firm  (supervisors,  personnel 
department,  maintenance  or  inventory services, .•.  );  these relationships  are 
facilitated  by  repeated  contact. 
(iii)  The  employer-employee  relationship is in itself a  complex  relationship, 
involving a  measure  of  trust and mutual  understanding which  can only be  developed 
gradually. 
(iv)  A longer-run employment  contract  provides  opportunities  not  present in 
short-lived contracts;  thus,rewarding realised performance  ex  post,  averaging 
between  good  and  bad years, or between periods  of pressure and slack,  is possible 
with regular  jobs,  but not with  casual  jobs. 
2.2  From  the  viewpoint  of workers,  the workplace  provides  one  among  many  examples 
of  areas  of  life where  regular relationships,  developed  over  time  on  a  continuing 
basis,  are essential  to  the pursuit of human  goals.  The  foremost  examples  are of 
course  the  family  and  friendship.  Medical  care,  education,  community  relationships, 
trades,  services,  leasure activities,  and  so on,  provide additional examples.  ~~ 
important  indirect benefit  from  a  regular  job lies  in the prospects which it affords 
for  founding  a  family,  buying a  house,  establishing consumption  patterns,  etc •••. 
In modern  economies,  fringe benefits  and social security benefits  are more 
exrensive for holders  of  regular  jobs,  thereby  increasing their attractiveness. 
These  benefits  form  a  growing part of overall  compensation. 
It is  thus  safe  to  assume  that most  individuals attach a positive value to hwing 
a r-egular job;  within the  context of such  jobs,  they  supply hours  (and effort)  in 
accordance with  the  traditional assumption of  a  diminishing marginal rate of 
substitution between  leasure  and  income.  This  eminently  sensible view is not in-
corporated  in standard  textbook  treatments  of  labour  supply,  because it introduces 
a  non-convexity  in preferences  and  a  discontinuity in the supply of hours.  It is 
however  incorporated  indirectly in the models  of  "learning by  doing"  and  "embodied 
human  capital",  which  aim at capturing  the  advantages  of regular  jobs  mentioned 
under  (i)  and  (ii)  above;  or in the  models  of  employment  over  time  under  uncertainty, 
where  a  simple  assumption of risk aversion brings in the aspects  mentioned  under 
(iii)  and  (iv)  above
3 
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For  a  proper appraisal of work-sharing measures,  the  significance of recognis-
ing  the positive value  to  workers  of  regular  jobs  is  twofold.  First  comes  the 
immediate  implication that  the distribution of an aggregate  number  of hours  over 
individual  jobs matters,  to  an  extent  imperfectly captured by  the  supply of hours. 
A distribution over more  jobs carries  the  advantage  of shorter hours  and  more 
leasure for all concerned;  in addition,  it carries  the  advantage  of endowing  more 
individuals with  positively valued regular  jobs~  . 
Second,  it is  important  to  recognise  that  the value  attached  to  a  regular 
job  varies  conside~ably, both  across  individuals,and for  given  individuals  over 
time. That different  individuals  may  value differently the stability of employment is 
an  immediate  corollary of  the diversity of  tastes.  There  is  no  need  to elaborate, 
but one  specific point  should be  mentioned.  The  idiosyncracies of attitudes  towards 
labour  concern also  the  supply of hours.  At  given wage  rates,  different  individuals 
would  prefer different working  times.  Yet,  it is  a  commonplace  observation that 
most  regular  jobs  specify standard working  times,  imposed  on whole  sets of  employees, 
with little room  for  individual variations.  A!so,  these  standard  working  times  vary 
little from  firm  to  firm.  There  are understandable  reasons  for  that uniformity 
(discussing  them would  be  peripheral  to  my  purpose).  Hopefully,  standard working 
times  may  reflect the  preferences  of  a  "median worker",  being  too  long  for half 
the  labour  force  and  too short for  the  other half.  When  faced  with  the  choice 
of either working  the  standard  time,  or not at all,  each  worker  takes  an ali-or-
none  decision.  The  net value  of  the  job will,  other things  equal,  be  the higher, 
the  closer standard working  time  comes  to an individual's  preferences.  In particular, 
those  who  would  prefer definitely shorter hours  will benefit less  from holding 
the  job.  It would  seem  plausible  that older workers  fall  into  that category  and  hence 
place  a  lower net value  on  regular  jobs. 
There  are  two  additional  reasons  why  the  value  to  any  individualofhaving a 
regular  job  is bound  to  decline  as  the  age  of retirement draws  near.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  period over which  a  stable relationship  is anticipated  becomes  shorter, 
hence  less  significant.  On  the  other hand,  the  link with other  durable patterns of 
behaviour  (family,  house, ••. )  becomes  less  important,  as  these  are well  established 
already. 
The  significance  of  individual variations  in the  value  of  regular  jobs  is of 
course  that  they offer prospects  for  gains  through  redistribution - a  point  that is 
central  to  some  work-sharing measures,  and  is  taken  up  in Section 7  below. -9-
2.3  The  considerations  in Section  2.1  pointing  to  the superiority of  regular 
employment  relationships  explain why  this  is  typically  the  form  of  employment 
preferred by business  firms.  They  also  suggest  two  important characteristics of 
regular  jobs. 
First,  the provision of a  regular job requires an  initial investment on  the 
part of the  firm - the  "toll" discussed at length by  Okun  (1981,  chapters  2,  3  ) 
and  turning  labour  into a  '·'semi-fixed  factor"  (Oi, 1962)  5  •  Obviously, the benefits 
of experience  acquired on the  job,  of  integration in a  work  team  and  in the  firm's 
organisation,  of mutual  trust or of  averaging  rewards  over  time  and  across  states, 
will accrue  only progressively after a  period of initiation.  There will often be 
a  period of  training,  during which  a  worker's  productivity may  be  ins~fficient to 
cover his  or her wage.  Furthermore,  because workers  are heterogeneous, firms  will 
attempt  to  identify the more  promising  candidates  through  screening.  Expenses 
associated with  training and  screening are in the nature of a  fixed  cost attached 
to  each  new  hiring.  Also,  to  the extent  that  the  firm is offering  some  degree of 
income  and  employment  stability6  ,  it is undertaking a  commitment,  which  may  under 
adverse  circumstances  prove  costly.  The  present value of whatever  costs  or risk 
premium  may  be  associated with  that  commitment  is  another  component  of  the  fixed 
cost of  a  new  hiring. 
An  important  implication of  this initial investment,  or toll,  is  the  typical 
preference of  firms  for hiring employees  on a  full-time rather  than  a  part-time 
basis.  By  "typical",  I  mean  here  that special advantages  iinked  to part-time work 
must  be  present  in order  for  that  form  of  employment  to be  offered.  (The  foremost 
example  comes  from  peak  loads within the week,  as  in retailing,  where  part-time work 
is  indeed widespread.)  Otherwise,  the initial investment  is basically  the  same 
whether  a  person· works  full  time or part time.  (This  is obvious  for  screening and 
training costs.  It is  also  true for on-the-job  learning.  If it takes  500 hours  to 
learn a  job well,  two  half-time workers  will need  1000  hours  together;  and  so  on.) 
Consequently,  full-time work  is altogether  cheaper,  and  part-time work  is  "typical-
ly"  confined  to  casual  jobs  7  ,  pending  special  inducements. 
Second,  "regular  jobs" are  not created at will,  they must  correspond to some 
real  employment  prospect in the  firm.  At  the start,  this  requires  the  av~ilability of 
a  working post,  the  existence of  demand  for  the  output,  and  relative prices at which 
the  additional  job  is profitable.  In addition,  the  firm must  anticipate  that  the 
additional  employee  will  remain wanted with  sufficient probability for  a  sufficient 
time.  Adverse  anticipations  or considerable uncertainty  about  technological 
developments,  demand  or relative prices  would  destroy  the prospect of potential 
employment.  The  disconcerting fact  is  that so  many  conditions  must  be fulfilled 
simultaneously  in order for  a  regular  job  to  be  forthcoming;  whereas  failure of  any 
one condi tim is enough·  to  an·nihi late  the  prospect. -10-
An  important  implication of  the  combination of  real  factors  needed  for  the 
existence  of  a  regular  job  is that  the  supply of  such  jobs  is bound  to be highly 
inelastic to their short-run cost.  Specifically,  temporary  wage  cuts  or employment 
subsidies will not be very effective  in increasing  the  supply of  regular  jobs. 
First,  the other elements  must  be  there(working posts  and  demand  for  output). 
Second  the relevant cost consideration is  the  long-run  cost over  the  prospective 
period of  employment,  of which  the  short-run cost is only a  part.  Thus,  temporary 
employment  subsidies will at best move  forward  in time hirings  that were  contem-
plated  anyhow 
8 
,  and  stimulate  casual  employment.  Desirable  as  they may  be,  these 
effects  remain  limited in scope. 
These  remarks  also help  to put  the  issue of  severance  pay  in sharper 
perspective.  It is often stressed that rights  to severance  pay deter  firms  from 
hiring additional workers  who  could profitably he employed  in the short run.  Clearly, 
if the  prospect for  continued  employment  is there,  severance  pay  (though relevant) 
is not  a  major  issue.  But if the  prospect for  continued  employment  is  lacking,  then 
no  regular  job  is at hand,  irrespective of  the severance pay  issue.  One  should  thus 
not  expect  a  reduction of  severance  pay  to have  a  major  influence  on  the  supply of 
regular  jobs.  At  the  same  time,  severance  pay  for  casual  jobs,  where it exists, 
will deter  that form of employment.  And  there is  scope  for  illusion about  the extent 
to which  a  job  is casual  or regular •••• It is thus  understandable  that proposals 
to  reduce  severance rights be  regarded with suspicion by unions.  And  it might  be 
more  judicious  to promote  instead labour  contracts  of fixed  duration
9 
• -II-
3.  SHORf-RUN  FLUCTUATIONS 
3.1  The  short-run equilibrium between  supply and demand  for  regular jobs is  subject 
to numerous  hazards  - as  we  know  only  too well  from  recent experience.  There  are 
several  independent  factors  affecting either  the  supply or  the  demand  for  regular 
jobs.  When  a  number  of  them  operate simultaneously  to  reduce  the  supply  and  inflate 
the  demand,  a  serious  imbalance may  result.  A long  time may  be  needed  to  correct 
that imbalance,  during which  time  selfperpetuating forces  are apt  to  be  at work. 
There  are clear signs  of such  an  unhappy  combination of circumstances  in  the 
present situation. 
To  begin with  the supply of  jobs  (demand  for  labour),  four  main  factors  should 
be  listed as  exerting macroeconomic  influences.  (These  factors  may  of  course affect 
specific labour markets  differently;  the  point of interest here  is  that,  when  these 
factors  affectmany  specific labour markets  of  a  given  country,  or set of countries, 
in the  same  direction,  then macroeconomic  implications become noticeable.) 
(i)  The  demand  for  output may  be  slack,  due  to  an excess  of savings  over in-
vestment,  to  a  fall  in  the  demand  for  exports,  to  a  contractionary fiscal policy, to a 
combination of these,  etc •••• 
(ii) Labour-saving  technological  progress may  reduce  the  demand  for  labour at 
given  levels  of output. 
(iii) Relative  factor prices  may  induce substitution of capital for  labour, 
or subsitution of production elsewhere  for  production in the  home  country. 
(iv)  The  capital stock  physically available,  or susceptible  of profitable use, 
may  become  insufficient to offer an adequate  number  of  jobs. 
Looking at a  given country at a  given time,  the  first three  factors  may  set in 
exogenously.  (This  is  obvious  for  technological  progress.  The  slack of  final  demand 
may  originate  abroad.  And  the  shift in relative factor prices may  reflect,  for 
instance,  the progress  of  industrialisation in developing  countries.)  These  factors 
may  also originate  in the  country itself,  as  when  domes tic labour costs undergo an auto-
no~ous movement,  which  may  in turn direct research  and  development  towards  labour-
saving  technological  progress.  In either case,  the  response  of  fiscal  policy is 
basically an  endogenous  factor  - but that does  not  guarantee  the  proper  response! 
And  a  selfperpetuating force  sets  in,  when  public deficits originating in the 
reduced  levels  of  employment  and  activity are  deemed  unbearable  and  fought  through 
reduced  public expenditure. -12-
Most  significantly,  as  the  demand  for  domestic output slackens,  investment  is 
discouraged,  plants are  scrapped,  and  the  capital stock is  brought  down  to  the 
level warranted by current output.  While  the  low  level of investment further 
reduces  aggregate  demand,  the  fourth  factor  comes  into play:  there are  no  longer 
enough  working posts  to  g~nerate adequate  employment;  reflating the  supply of jobs 
now  requires  investment in  new  capacity;  the  growth of employment  is bound to be slow, 
even in the  face  of a  detr.and upheaval; and  demand  management  is discouraged by  the fear 
that  insufficient capacities  lead  to inflationary pressures. 
Turning  to  the  demand  for  jobs  (the supply of  labour),  the main factors 
operating in the short run  are  the  demographic  and migratory movements,  and  the 
changes  in participation rates.  In  some  European  countries,  female  participation 
rates have  gone  up  steadily over  the past decades,  resulting in significant increases 
in labour  supply  through  the recession. 
Although  there  is frequent  reference  in the  literature to  the so-called 
"discouraged worker effect", it may  also be  the  case that  unemployment  discourages 
some  workers  (especially married women)  from quitting jobs which  they would  other-
wise have  given up  temporarily;  at the  same  time,  unemployment  may  induce  others 
to  register as  job  seekers,  even  though  they might otherwise have  postponed  entry 
in the  labour force.  In this way,  unemployment  becomes  subject to selfperpetuation. 
3.2  The  two  characteristics of regular  jobs discussed under 2.3 above  take  up 
additional significance,  when  the  prospect of sizeable short-run fluctuations  is 
recognised. 
First,  because  regular  jobs  entail an initial investment,  prospective 
fluctuations  shift the  terms  of  trade against  them  and  in favour  of  casual  jobs. 
In particular,  at  times  of high uncertainty about  demand,  technology  and  real 
wages  in the  future,  one  may  expect a  temporary increase  in the  reliance  on  casual 
employment.  Unfortunate  as  this development  may  be,  given the well-founded preference 
of  employees  for  regular jobs,  it is  to  so~e extent unavoidable,  and still compatible 
with  efficiency.  In particular,  postponing  the investment into a new hiring unti  1 it  can be 
directed more  effectively may  be desirable.  This  would call for  accepting  a  develop-
ment  of casual  jobs  during  a  recession,  and  waiting for  the  signs  of recovery  to 
incur  the  tolls of  job creation in  those  activities which do benefit from  the recovery. 
There  is  some  casual  evidence  that  the  private sector is relying more  intensive-
ly on  casual  employment  (including sub-contracting and  contracting ad  interim)  in 
times  of  recession  and  uncertainty,  like nowadays.  In  the  public sector,  special 
employment  programs  make  sense  in such  times,  especially those  providing casual 
jobs  for  the  young.  The  attractiveness· of  these  programs  comes  from  the  relative 
ease  and  speed with which  they  can be  set up,  from  their low  net costs,  and  hope-
fully  from  the  social value.of  the  associated output. -13-
Second,  because  the  supply of regular  jobs  is inelastic to wage  costs  in the 
short run, relying on wage  flexibility to clear the markets  for regular  jobs  is not 
a  realistic prospect.  Indeed,  market clearing wages  could drop  to very  low  levels 
in response  to a  conjunction  of adverse  shocks.  Most  likely, wages could drop  to 
a  level where  the  "market  clears"  ••.  because sizeable unemployment  becomes 
voluntary!  That is,  market  clearing wages  could  drop  to  a  level sufficiently close 
to  the opportunity cost of workers  (including unemployment  benefits  - about  which 
more  below)  that many  of  them become  unattracted by  employment  (although still 
registered as  involuntarily unemployed,  to collect the benefits). 
There are  two  compelling reasons  why  that kind of flexibility is undesirable. 
The  first,  of  a  microeconomic  nature,  is that it would  generate  an extent of 
income  uncertainty placing an excessive burden  on workers holding regular jobs. 
That  argument  is  taken up  in Section 4,  and  extended  to  a  discussion of wage 
discrimination between workers  under  contract and  new  recruits.  The  second,of  a 
macroeconomic  nature is that a  major  drop  in labour  incomes  would  depress  aggre-
gate  demand  further,  leading to an "equilibrium" with very  low  levels  of output 
and  employment.  The  fact  that  the  resulting unemployment  be  labeled "voluntary" 
provides  little solace .... Given our  imprecise estimates  of  the wage  elasticity 
of  labour demand  and  of  the  income  multiplier,  not  to mention our near ignorance 
of  the  implications  of wage  moderation for  government  budgets,  it is safer to  look 
at  incomes  policy as  a  long-run  instrument  and  not  to rely  on it as  a  short-run 
stabiliser of employment. 
4.  LABOUR  CONTRACTS  AND  MARKET  FAILURES 
4.1  How  then  does  one  reconcile  the  idea that most  people  want  to have  a  regular 
job  and  stable  income  with  the  prospect of recurrent  fluctuations  in the  demand 
for  labour?  This  very question is  taken  up  in recent  theoretical work  on  labour 
contracts,  known  as  "implicit  (labour)  contracts" the?ry;  see Azaradias  (1975), 
Baily  (1974)  and  Gordon  (1974)  for  the  seminal contributions;  Dreze  (1979  b)  for 
a  non-technical presentation of  the  main  ideas;  and  the more  recent  accounts  in 
the Quarterly  Journal of Economics,  Supplement  1983,  or  in the  surveys  by 
Azariadis  (1979),  Ito  (1982)  and  Rosen  (1985). -14-
The  merit of  that  theory consists in looking at  the  shocks  affecting labour 
markets  ex ante,  as  of  the  time when  an  employment  relationship is initiated 
with some  prospect for duration.  A current limitation of  the  theory is  that it 
looks  only at employment  patterns withinpreexisting contracts,  and  does  not address 
itself to disequilibrium on  the market for contracts.  I  shall consider  the  two 
issues  successively,  then  sum  up  the  argument  in Section 4.5. 
The  main  premisses  of  implicit contracts  theory are: 
(i)  in the  face  of fluctuations  in output  and  labour  demand,  lasting employ-
ment  relationships  (regular  jobs)  offer scope  for  pursuing  employment  and  compensa-
tion policies which  are Pareto optimal ex ante  from  the viewpoint of  the  firm  and  i~ 
employees; 
(ii) workers,  being  unable  to  diversi~y their labour supply,  are  more  risk-averse 
than  firms,  whose  shareholders  can hold diversified portfolios; 
(iii)  incentives,  moral  hazard,  information asymmetries,  the  illegality of 
involuntary servitude, a.s.o.,  place  limitations  on  implementable contracts. 
This  is not  the place  to  review or summarise  a  sizeable  and  growing  literature, 
to  which  accessible  introductions  are  available  elsewhere  (see  referenc~above). 
The  main point of relevance  to  us  here  is  that efficient labour  contracts will 
embody  an  element of risk-sharing,  whereby  labour  incomes  are  to  a  sizeable extent 
protected  from  the  vagaries  of  supply  and  demand  shocks.  If wages  were  allowed 
to  jump  up  and  down  in response  to  these  shocks, the resulting  income  uncertainty 
would  be  costly to bear for  workers,  more  so  than  it would benefit  the  less  risk-
averse  firms.  Hence  the  prospect for  Pareto superior  arrangements,  where  the 
labour contracts include a  form  of income  insurance  through  downward  wage  rigidity. 
The  insurance  premium  should  be  paid  partly  through  lower wages  during  the early 
period of employment  (explaining to  some  extent  the practice of  seniority bonuses), 
partly  through  reduced  upward  wage  flexibility  (to  the  extent  compatible with 
incentives).  A Pareto-optimal  arrangement  would  combine  an  efficient degree of risk-
sharing  (whereby  in particular labour  incomes  become  immune  from  firm-specific 
risks  and  bear a  less-than-proportional  share of economy-wide  risks 10 )  with 
privately efficient levels of  employment  (marginal  value  product  of  labour  equal 
to  its opportunity cost for workers  at all  times). -15-
The  combination of  downwards  wage  rigidity and efficient levels of employment 
implies  that wages  actually paid  out  do  not  correspond  to  the ~arginal value 
product of  labour at all  times,  but only  do  so in expectation.  In particular, 
during  a  recession,  wages  will  in many  firms  exceed  the marginal value product of 
labour.  These  firms  will be  said  to practise "labour hoarding".  It is an  immediate 
implication of  the  theory  that  such  firms  will not hire  new  workers,  even at wages 
lower  than those which  they currently  pay_;  new  hirings will start only at wages 
lower  than  the marginal value  product of  labour,  with all employees  under  contract 
working full hours.  For  these  firms  (which  could well be  a  majority during a  deep 
recession),  the elasticity of  employment  with respect  to wage  decreases  is  zero 
11 
As  for  the workers  under  contract,  whatever  degree of unemployment  would 
have been voluntary at market clearing wages  remains  warranted  (Pareto efficient) 
at the rigid wages;  the marginal  value product of labour  should not fall below 
the reservation wage  of  the workers  - but  should fall  that much!  The  difference 
is  that,  at the  downward  rigid wage,  unemployment  appears  to be  involuntary - and 
is definitely perceived as  such  by  the  individual worker;  or else,  laid off 
workers  should  enjoy full  income  insurance,  which  is  seldom observed in practice 
(probably because  firms  cannot afford  to  supply  that much  insurance).  Efficient 
arrangements  again call for  wbrk  sharing among  employees  under  contract,  who 
should preferably be  laid-off on  a  part-time basis at  times  of slack employment, 
to the extent  compatible with  incentives  and  the  organisation of work.  In practice, 
that approach  seems  applicable only  to blue collar workers;  temporary  layoffs, 
whether  on  a  part-time or full-time basis,  are practically unknown  among  white 
collars 12 •  And  part-time layoffs  for blue collars  are often discouraged by  the 
rules  governing  unemployment  compensation,  which  is not always  forthcoming  on  a 
flexible,  part-time basis. 
4.2  There  is very little hard  evidence  on  the extent to  which  the  recommendations 
of  implicit contract  theory are  implemented  in practice 13  ,  beyond  the  easy observa-
tion of widespread  downward  rigidity of wages,  either real  (as  in most  European 
countries)  or  nominal  (as  in the  US).  The  extent to which  firms  use  labour  at marginal 
products  below  nominal  wages  in bad  times  (and  conversely  in good  times)  is not  easy 
to ascertain,  beyond  the  general belief  (corroborated by  econometric studies)  that 
firms  practice  "labour hoarding"  during recessions.  Neither do  we  know  precisely how 
reductions  of  labour  inputs  are distributed over workers  under  contract - a  subject 
on which  some  evidence  should  now  be  available  in Europe  14  •  Collecting and  analysing 
that evidence  would  seem  worthwhile,  if only  for  the  light it could  throw  on  the 
related  issue of  including  the  unemployed  in work-sharing  schemes. -16-
A partial indication is available at the  European  level for  employees  of 
the steel industry.  Some  recent  figures  are  reproduced  in Table 3.  It is unfortunate 
that no  details  are given on  the  category  "other leavers",  whose  content  seems  to 
differ as  between countries  (presumably,  it includes  temporary  layoffs  in France 
and  Germany,  but not  in Italy and  the  UK).  Still,  there  are  important  national 
differences in separation patterns,  especially in the  form  of dismissals  and 
resignations.  And  it is interesting to notethe significance of early retirements. 
As  for  temporary  layoffs  and  part-time unemployment,  there is evidence  that 
they move  pro-cyclically.  Some  recent figures  are  reproduced  in Table  4.  They  do 
suggest  that the  phenomenon  is both significant  and  limited  in  scope. 
4.3  The  literature in print about labour contracts  does  not explain why  we  observe 
prolonged  spells  of mass  unemployment,  with  large  numbers  of workers  without regular 
jobs  (without contracts).  The  theory  in print deals with properties  of efficient 
contracts  in economies  where  the markets  for-contracts  clear, it does  not deal with 
disequilibrium on  these markets.  To  understand  the  issue of work-sharing,  we  must 
go  beyond  the  findings  of implicit contract  theory  and  consider situations  of 
disequilibrium on  the market  for regular  jobs.  Of  course,  the existing theory has 
useful  implications  for  these situations  as well,  some  of which  are  spelled out  in 
Section 4.4 below.  But  a  major extension is needed,  which  calls  for  a  model  with 
successive generations 15 '  ~. 
Consider again ex ante  the prospect of sizeable fluctuations  in the  supply of 
regular  jobs  (in the  marginal value product of regular  labour),  taking into  account 
the  fact  that  a  new  generation of workers will enter  the  labour market  in  the  future, 
under  conditions  that may  be  either "good"  or  "bad".  If conditions  are  "good", 
there will be  full  employment  of both  initially employed workers  and  newcomers. 
If conditions  are  ''bad",  there will not be  enough  regular  jobs  for  everybody at 
full hours.  How  could  the  prospect of excess  demand  for  regular  jobs  under  "bad" 
conditions be eliminated? 
The  answer which  is  implicit  in the  implicit contracts  literature is  the 
following.  Assume  that the members  of the  new  generation are  present~  or-represented~ 
when  the initial labour contracts  are  drawn.  It will  then  be  possible  for  firms  to 
hire ·the newcomers  forward~  specifying the  compensation  and  terms  of  employment 
simultaneously  for  the  "good"  and  "bad"  conditions.  The  newcomers  would  thus  be 
under  contract  from  the start,  on  par with  earlier generations;  the  only  difference 
being  that actual  employment  of  the newcomers  starts later.  In  so  far  as  clearing 
the market  for  contracts  is  concerned,  all workers  (the  old and  the  new)  would 
be  treated  symmetrically, and  a  global  equilibrium could be  characterised.  Under  that E
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West  Germany  France  France  Belgium 
SESPROS  SESPROS  IN SEE  IRES 
1973  119  33.3 
1974  133.4  41.9 
1975  773  427.2  82.5 
1976  277  180  309  58.5 
1977  231  319  136.9*  69. I 
1978  191  230  162.7  69.8 
1979  88  139  90.3  69.6 
57 .4* 
1980  137  185  101.5*  80.3 
1981  347  398  191.3  93.6 
116.2* 
1982  606  220  75.3  82.5 
1983  675  233  109. I  81.7 
TABLE  4.  Temporary  layoffs  (Thousands  of employees) 
Sources  SESPROS.  Eurostat,  Protection  Sociale,  2,  1984. 
These  numbers  are  annual  averages  and  include  temporary 
layoffs  due  to weather  conditions. 
INSEE.  Enquete  Emploi  (Publication annuelle). 
These  numbers  apply to  a  single week  in march  or april, 
and  do  not  include  temporary  layoffs  due  to weather 
conditions. 
* denotes  a  single week  in october. 
IRES.  A.  Sonnet  et P.  Defeyt,  "Le  march6  du  travail  en 
Belgique",  Bulletin n°  94,  1984. - 19-
global  equilibrium,  everbody would  work  full hours  under  "good"  conditions,  and 
everybody would  take part in some  fom of work  shar:ing under  ''bad" conditiona  -
hopefully,  to  such  an  extent that the marginal value product of  labour be  equal 
to  the opportunity cost of hours.  In such  a  world,  no  excess  demand  for regular 
jobs would  occur  in bad states;  instead,  a  proper degree  of  labour hoarding and 
work  sharing would be built into the private contracts,  leaving no  scope  for public 
intervention.  In particular,old and  young  would  participate symmetrically in the 
labour-hoarding and  work-sharing arrangements 
16 
Of  course,  the assumption  that potential  future  workers  take  part in a  market 
clearing process  years  ahead  of  time  is a  preposterous  idea,  to  say  the  least. 
Yet,  that is  the very stretch of imagination required  to  rescue  the  ''magic of  the 
market"  in our context- which is loaded with "market  failures" 
17
• 
4.4  An  intriguing question,  not explicitly answered  (to  the best of my  knowledge} 
by  the  labour  contract  theory in print,  is  that of wage  discrimination between 
employees  under  contract and  new  recruits.  I  have  alluded  in Section  3~2 to  two 
reasons,  one  microeconomic  (spelled out  in Section 4.1)  and  one  macroeconomic, 
why  it may  not be  desirable  to let wages  of workers  under contract fall to market 
clearing levels  during  recessions.  But  these  reasons  do  not by  themselves  preclude 
a  form of wage  discrimination,  whereby  new  contracts would  stipulate wages  different 
from  those  of  extant contracts.  Specifically,  new  recruits  could be  paid wages  that 
clear  the  labour market  for  new  contracts, while  previously employed  workers  would 
keep  their earlier w~ges.  Evidence  that  such is not  the  case  comes,  on  the  one 
hand  from  the  observation of mass  unemployment;  on  the other hand  from  casual 
empiricism to  the  effect that wage  discrimination by  hiring dates  is not  a  wide-
spread  phenomenon. 
Of  course,  some  degree  of discrimination by  dates  of hiring is consistent 
with  the  available  evidence.  And  it is known  that the quality of new  recruits at 
g1ven  job  characteristics  improves  during recessions  and  deteriorates during booms 
-see Okun  (1981,  pp.  67-68)  and  references  given there  (pp.  79-80). But  there is 
no  doubt  that  downward  wage  rigidity applies  to  new  contracts  as  well,  with  limited 
wage  discrimination vis-a-vis  previously  employed workers. -W-
It could well be that such discrimination is regarded  as  impractical by 
firms  and  as  undesirable by  firms  and workers  alike.  Wage  settlements,  including 
differentials  by  occupation and  seniority,  are complex  enough already.  Adding  an 
extra dimension to  the existing differentials would  increase  that complexity,  to 
an extent possibly regarded  as  impractical.  And  it certainly goes  against  the  ~rain 
of accepted ethical norms  to accentuate pay differences  for  equal work. 
It is, however,  a  direct,  and  to  my  mind  compelling,  consequence  of  implicit 
contract  theory  that some  degree  of wage  rigidity for new  contracts  should  emerge. 
For otherwise  new  firms  (or  expanding established firms)  could hire newcomers  at 
very  low  wages  and  outbid  established firms  on  the product markets,  thereby 
reducing further  their output  and  employment.  It is thus  in the  joint interest of 
established  firms  and  their  (unionised ••• )  employees  to prevent,  if they  can,  the 
wages  specified in new  contracts  from  dropping to market  clearing levels  (to levels 
at which  all unemployment  becomes  voluntary).  Furthermor~,  a  majority of newcomers 
is apt  to endorse  that attempt,  whenever  the market clearing wages  would be very 
low  (say,  close  to  the  level of unemployment  compensation).  Indeed,  all workers 
with  a  reservation wage  higher  than or equal  to  the market clearing level  stand 
to gain from  the wage  rigidity,  and  similarly for  those with  a  reservation wage 
slightly inferior  to  the clearing level 
18 
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The  absence  of market  mechanisms  leading to wage  discrimination between 
workers  under  contract and  new  recruits has  led to  a  number  of proposals  for 
marginal  employment  subsidies- see,  e.g. Dornbusmet al.  (1983)  or Steinherr 
(1985).  As  I  have  noted  above  (Section 2.3),  such subsidies  should be  substantial 
and  durable  in order  to  affect significantly the  long-run cost of  a  regular  job, 
hence  employment.  In addition,  the  argument  presented in this section suggests 
that existing firms,  and  their employees,  may  object  to  such subsidies  as  generat-
ing unfair competition on  the  product markets. 
4.5  We  can  now  summarise  the  implications of  labour contract  theory for  the workers 
seeking employment  during a  recession  (the new  entrants,  and  those who  have  lost 
their  jobs,  for  instance in firms  closing down).  These  job  seekers  are  facing  two 
kinds  of  firms,  those  engaged  in labour hoarding  (which  contract  employment), and 
those  (including  the new  firms)  which hire new  workers.  The  former,  which may  well 
be  a  majority  during a  severe  recession,  operate at a  marginal  value  product of -21-
labour  inferior to wage  costs  and  equal  to  the reservation wage  of  their employees. 
Routine  demographic  replacements,  which will normally absorb all new  entrants  in 
stationary conditions,  are not  taking place.  Newcomers  are excluded both  from  the 
labour hoarding and  from whatever work  sharing is  organised.among  employees  under 
contract.  And  these  firms  will-not respond  to wage  cuts  by  new  hirings,  until the 
gap  between wage  costs  and  the marginal  value product of  labour has  been bridged. In 
these  firms,  competition between workers  under  contract and  newcomers  is shut off. 
Expanding  firms  and  new  firms  hire  labour  to  the point where  its marginal 
value  product  covers  wage  costs,  but not beyond.  And  they practise little or no 
wage  discrimination between workers  under  contract and  newcomers. 
We  thus  have  three  groups  of workers:  {i)  those  under  contract in firms  which 
are  not hiring,  where  they  are  employed  at a  marginal  value  product below their 
wages;  (ii)  those  employed  in new  and hiring firms,  with  a  marginal  value  product 
equal  to  their wage;  and  (iii)  the  unemployed. 
There  are  two  sources  of  inefficiency  in this  situation. First,  employment 
should  increase in the  expanding  firms,  to  the point where  the  marginal  value 
product of  labour is  equal  to  the reservation wage  of  the  unemployed.  It is not 
.clear how  this  can be achieved without  some  form of wage-cost discrimination 
between workers  under  contract and  newcomers. 
Second,  the distribution of  jobs  and hours worked  between  the  employed  and 
the  unemployed  is inefficient.  Indeed,  I  have  adduced  in Section  2  some  quite 
compelling  arguments  to  the  effect that some  newcomers  at least will place  a 
higher value on  finding  a  regular  job  than some  workers  under  contract attach  to 
keeping  theirs.  (In particular,  young  workers  may  be more  eager  to start a  career 
than workers  close  to retirement are eager  to bring their own  to  term.)  Hence, 
some  redistribution of  regular  jobs between workers  under  contract and  newcomers 
would  be  desirable - but will not be  naturally forthcoming.  In addition,  the  supply 
of hours  being definitely upward  sloping, ·within  the  context of  regular  jobs,  it 
would be desirable  to  increase  the number  of  employees  and  redistribute  aggregate 
hours  among  them- a  standard argument.  Thus,  whether we  look at positively valued 
jobs,  or at negatively valued hours  of work,  we  conclude  that  the allocation of 
work  between newcomers  and  workers  under contract  is  inefficient. (4) 
-22-
Finally,  it is easy  to  understand why  little or no  work-sharing  takes  place 
among  newcomers,  in the  form of part-time jobs.  With.  firms  facing  fixed  costs  of 
screening and  training,  and  half the newcomers  prepared  to work  more  than full-
time  (as  must  be  the  case if standard working  time  corresponds  to median worker 
preferences),  there is  ample  scope  for mutually agreeable  contracts  on  a  full-
time basis.  The  special motivation of risk sharing embodied  in a  long-term contract 
would  be  needed  to organise work  sharing in the  form of part-time  unemployment. 
That motivation does  not apply  to work  sharing in the  form of·part-time work  for 
newcomers.  Again,  special measures will be  needed  to overcome  the market  failure 
and  bring about  a  more  efficient allocation of regular jobs. 
The  upshot of  these  arguments  is  •••  precisely what  we  observe  today  in 
Europe!  Namely,  a  prolonged spell of  deeply depressed  demand  for  labour,  with 
employment  declining  in many  firms  (especially in the manufacturing sector exposed 
to  international competition),  downward  rigid wages  there and a modest degree  of work 
sharing  among  workers.under contract;  with very high  unemployment. rates  among  the 
young  entrants  to  the labour market  (and  older workers  who  have  lost their previous 
jobs),  and  a  fair degree  of wage  rigidity on new  contracts.  The  resulting alloca-
tion of work  among  all workers  is definitely inefficient,  both because  little or no 
work  sharing  takes  place between workers  under  contract  and  newcomers,  and because 
little or no  work  sharing takes  place  among  newcomers  finding  employment.  More 
efficient work  sharing thus  requires  special measures. 
5.  SCOPE  FOR  INTERVENTION 
5.1  Market  failures  provide  a  motivation .for public intervention aimed at correcting 
inefficiencies.  In  the  case  under  discussion,  that motivation is  enhanced by  the 
existence of a  social externality.  Unemployment  is not only a  burden on  individuals, 
who  are  frustrated  in their desire  to work  and  to  enjoy  a  stable employment  relation-
ship.  It also entails  additional real burdens  for  society - for  instance when 
prolonged  inactivity leads  to  deliquency or health deterioration;  that is, it entails 
externalities.  Of  course,  the  most  immediate externality comes  from  the  existence 
of  unemployment  compensation  schemes. -23-
In the light of  the arguments  reviewed  above, it is obvious  that public 
unemployment  compensation schemes  are important  and  should be maintained,  in 
spite of  some  obvious  drawbacks 19  •  Now  unemployment  compensation accrues  to the 
unemployed at no  private cost; but it is paid out of public funds  which  need  to be 
collected somehow 20  and  thus  entail a  social cost.  This  creates  an externality. 
Any  measure  resulting in less unemployment  also results in less public expenditure 
on unemployment  compensation.  More  positively,  the  money  spent on unemployment 
compensation could more  profitably be spent on reducing unemployment.  One  way  is 
to subsidise  ~ork sharing~  the~by providing financial incentives to overcome  the 
market  failures. 
There  are  two  additional reasons,  specific· to  the  issue under discussion,  why 
public measures  aimed at promoting work  sharing could possibly be effective. 
First,  social security.has become  in most  European countries  a  complex legal 
system,  many  provisions of which  introduce additional distortions in the  already 
imperfect functioning of labour markets.  An  obvious  example  arises when  ceilings 
or other regressive  formulae  for social security contributions  (employment  taxes) 
impose  a  penalty on part-time  jobs  as  compared with full-time  jobs.  Eliminating 
those  distortions which  discourage work  sharing,  possibly creating distortions 
which  favour it, offers  scope for public intervention. 
Second,  the organisation of working  time is a  complex  social phenomenon,  in-
volving  coordination of all kinds  of activities, with numerous  externalities; it 
falls  largely outside  the  sphere of market  allocation.  To  take again  an obvious 
example,  think back  to  the  transition from  the  6-days  week  to  the  5-days  week. 
Although  5  days  became  the norm  for blue collar workers  shortly after World  War  II, 
it took nearly  twenty years before  that schedule became  universal,  with schools 
adopting it late.  And  it is  prob~bly fair to  say that  consumption patterns fully 
adjusted to  a  5-days week  for all are still spreading.  With  further reductions  in 
~orking time  below  40  hours  per week  now  emerging here  and  there,  a  number  of 
alternative patterns of work  are possible.  The  coordination aspects  and  externalities 
provide  scope  for public initiative in sorting out  the costs  and benefits  for 
soaiety of  these alternative patterns, then for public  leadersh~p in promoting  the 
most  desirable pattern and  anchoring  individuals  expectations  in that respect. 
These  points are  taken up  again in Part II. -M-
6.  INTERLUDE  (Sorbet~ 
Before  turning to consider specific measures  aimed  at promoting work-
sharing and  recent experience with  them  in Europe,  it is suggestive  to speculate 
briefly on  how  a  substantial decline  in the demand  for  regular  labour would  be 
handled in a  decide~ycooperative environment- like a  kibbutz,  a  network  of 
cooperatives  (as  in Mondragon)  or an  integrated set of  family businesses.  For 
definiteness,  think about a  hypothetical kibbutz where  the major use  of labour 
(entirely supplied by  the members)  goes  into the manufacturing of  some  gadget 
sold outside.  Normally,  young  members  are  taken up  into the  factory work  force and 
trained to replace retiring older members.  Assume  now  that a  non-negligible decline 
occurs  in the  need  for  labour  input,  a  decline that was  not anticipated with 
certainty,  although its possibility may  have  been contemplated - say a  decline 
due  to a  major accidental plant destruction or to a  shortage of  raw  materials,  to 
a  major decline  in demand  for  the  gadget,  to  the  introduction of a  new  labour 
saving  technology,  or a  combination of  these.  And  let the decline be  expected  to 
last for  some  time,  with progressive resorption over  a  period of months  or years at 
a  highly uncertain speed.  How  would  the kibbutz  community  react  to  such an event? 
Most  likely,  a  whole  set of measures  would be  combined,  such  as:  (i)  diverting 
some  labour  to other uses,  previsouly endowed  with  lower priority,  like improving 
the  grounds,  repainting the buildings, ••• ;  (ii)  excusing  from work  in the  factory 
the older,  less able  or. less motivated workers,  as well  perhaps  as  some  with 
high productivity alternatives  (like young  mothers,  or members  with valuable 
personal projects);  (iii) reducing across  the board effective working  times, 
through  either shorter hours,  or  longer vacations,  or occasional  days  off; 
(iv)  calling some  of  the  young workers  into the  workforce  on  a  part-time basis, 
with  the rest of their  time  devoted  to continued  education,  or  to  the other work 
mentioned  under  (i). 
The  list could be  extended.  The  point  I  wish  to make  is that various  forms 
of work  sharing would  naturally be  introduced;  and  1t is highly unlikely that a 
large number  of young  members  would  remain totally inactive for  prolonged  periods. 
There  is room  for speculation as  to who  would  carry out  the  casual activities 
mentioned  under  (i). Would  these be mostly  entrusted to  the  young,  or would  some 
of  the  members  previously employed  in the  factory  turn to such  tasks?  More 
specifically,  would  one  observe  simultaneously the  introduction of  some  young -25-
members  into the factory workforce and  the  diversion of some  factory workers  to 
casual  tasks -either part-time or full-time?  There is no  compelling  answer  to 
that question.  The  only safe consideration is  the following.  If it were  anti-
cipated that future  needs  for  labour will be qualitatively so different  from 
current needs  that  training acquired now  will be  of little value  in the  future, 
then young workers would  be mostly oriented towards  casual activities and would 
not be  trained now  for  factory work. 
This  digression provides  a  us.eful ·background  against which  to evctluate 
the alternative forms  of  work  sharing which  have ·been  considered recently by 
European policy-makers.  I  will  group  them  under  three headings:  trading jobs, 
i.e. replacing a  worker  under  contract by  a  newcomer;  sharing jobs,  i.e. filling 
a  single working  post by  more  than one  person;  and  trading hours  for  jobs,  i.e. 
reducing working  time  for workers  under  contract to create new  jobs. -26-
PART  II:  APPLICATIONS  (HOW?  HOW  NOT  ...  ) 
7.  TRADING  JOBS  (Early  Retirements) 
7.1  Trading  jobs between workers  under contract and  unemployed  persons  is  the 
simplest,  and  in a  way  the most  natural,  form  of work  sharing.  In particular, 
it does  not  interfere at all with  the  organisation of work.  Because  the value 
to individuals  of regular jobsvaries  from  one  person to  the next,  there  is  scope 
for mutually advantageous  trading 21  • 
By  definition,  the holder of a  regular job places  a  non-negative value  on 
that  job  - otherwise,  (s)he would  quit.  But  that value  could be  small - in which 
case  a  small  "bribe" would  induce  the holder  to  give  up  the  job.  If the  "bribe" 
per year falls  short of  the  level of unemployment  compensation,  the state can "buy" 
the  job  for  an unemployed  person,  at no  net cost  (the  compensation paid  to  the 
quitter is no  longer paid  to the new  employee);  this  generates ·a  positive externali-
ty,  namely  the value of  the  job  to  the  new  employee. 
Also,  the  value  of  a  job  is often blown up artificially by  the social legislation· 
For  instance,  some  statutory pensions  are proportional to  average  salary over  the last 
~five years  prior to  retirement age;  consequently,quitting during  these  five years 
entails a  cost by  far in excess of the  salary itself; see  Hart  (1984,  p.  27).  The 
state could  then step in to correct the externality - say by neutralising the effect 
of  early quitting on  the  pension. 
These  two  ideas  are  combined  in early retirement  schemes,  as  introduced  in 
several  European countries  over  the past decade  (namely,  in 1976  in  the  Netherlands 
and  Belgium,  in 1977  in the  UK,  in 1981  complementing  earlier measures in France, in 
1984  in Germany).  As  explained  in Section 2,  workers  close  to  retirement  are natural 
candidates  for  giving up  jobs,  under moderate  financial  incentives  (but  subject  to 
suitable adjustments  in pension rules).  All  the  schemes  under  consideration permit 
early retirement,  at no  loss of pension rights after the  normal  age  of  retirement, 
and with  an  income  allowance  over  the  interm~diate years.  The  level of that transi-
t 
tory  income,  and  its sources,  vary  from  scheme  to  scheme;  typically,  the basic  c~-
ponent  corresponds  to  unemployment  compensation,  and  an additional allowance  is 
sometimes  provided by  the  firm or by  the state.  In several  schemes,  the  retired 
worker  must  be  replaced  by  an  unemployed  (a young  one,  in Belgium);  or else,  the -27-
firm must make  a  cas.e that it operates with excess  labour,  so  that early retire-
ments  are a  substitute for  dismissals.  Although most  sche111es  provide  incentives 
for voluntary  retirements  and none  makes  it compulsory  across  the board,  there 
are  undoubtedly many  cases where  the worker's  hand is forced  by  defining un-
appealing alternatives  (being laid off,  or  transferred .•• ). And  there are un-
doubtedly  cases where  the  employer's  hand  is forced  towards  entering a  program 
with mandatory  replacements. 
I  have  not  seen a  systematic account  and-analysis of early retirement 
programs  at the  European level.  But  the  fragmentary  country data which  I  have 
come  across  indicate clearly that  these programs  can  involve substantial numbers 
of people. 
(i)  In the  UK,  the  Job  Release Scheme,  introduced in 1976,  offers  a  weekly 
allowance  to older workers  retiring early,  provided  their employer  agrees  to 
replace  them  by  unemployed  persons.  The  al1owance  is paid until  the  age  of 
normal  retirement,  and varies  (from  £ 48  to  £  61  per week)  with  family  and health 
status.  The  age of eligibility has  varied over  time  from  64  to  62  years  of  age 
for  men;  it is  59  for women  and  60  for  disabled  men.  Participation in  the  program 
is entirely voluntary.  Davies  and Metcalf  (1985)  refer to  numbers  of entrants 
into  the  program adding  up  to  272.100  persons  over  the period 1976-1984,  with  a 
stock of  participants totalling 75.000 persons  in 1985.  They  also  quote  a  re-
placement ratio  (new  hirings  per entrant)  of  92  % and  claim  that "the Job  Release 
Scheme  has  the  lowest net  cost per  person off the  [unemployment]  register" of all 
the  Special  Employment  Programs  implemented  in the  UK  (namely,  £ 1650  per person-
year in 1985,  obtained  from  a  gross  cost of £3250 after netting out  the  savings 
in unemployment  allowances).  They  also  claim that the  scope of  the  program could 
be  more  than doubled,  by  extending eligibility to all men  aged  60-64. 
(ii)  In France,  several early retirementprograms  have been  implemented,  one 
with mandatory  replacements  initiated in 1981  ("Contrats  de  solidarite"),  the 
others without mandatory  replacements  initiated earlier.  According  to  Marchand 
(1984),  there were  as  of  the  end  of  1983  some  700.000 beneficiaries of early 
retirement  programs  in France,  namely: 
Contrats  de  solidarite 
Previous  programs:  early  retirements  due  to  dismissals 
voluntary early retirements 
180.000 
284.000 
230.000 
694. ooo. -28-
The  replacement ratio is known  only for  the "Contrats  de solidarite",  where it is 
reportedly close  to  95  %.  It is of course ·null in case of dismissals,  and  held  to 
be  relatively  low  under  the previous  schemes  which did not  include mandatory 
replacement  provisions.  The  gross  cost of  these  programs.,  as  estimated from 
national  accounts,  seems  to be of the same  order of magnitude  as  in the  UK  (around 
£  3200  per beneficiary per year).  As  of April  1983,  the  "Contrats  de  solidarite" 
program was  discontinued;  instead,  voluntary retirement  was  offered  to all 
workers  aged  60  or more  with 37.5 years  of  labour force seniority.  Apparently, 
no  mandatory  replacements  are  involved •••• 
(iii)  In Belgium,  a  number  of early retirement  schemes  have been  implemented 
since  1977;  the age  of eligibility has  been mostly  60  for men  and  55  for women; 
except  in the  case of dismissals,  replacement  by  an  unemployed  person aged  less 
than 30  is mandatory.  Observed  replacement ratios  reach  63  % overall  and  83  % 
if dismissals  are set aside.  As  of October  1984,  the overall number  of beneficiaries 
totalled 138.000- see  Sonnet  and  Defeyt  (1984). 
These  data are very  fragmentary,  and  leave unanswered  many  questions worthy of 
further  investigation.  In particular,one would  like to find  out: 
(i)  What  proportion of  the effectively eligible population has  joined 
voluntary programs  of early retirement,  and  how  that proportion has  varied with 
age,  with sex,  with qualifications or occupations  and with  the  income  maintenance 
provisions  of  the  programs;  hopefully,  there  is  enough variation in  the provisions, 
both across  countries  and  within countries  across  specific groups,  to  throw  some 
light on  this  issue. 
(ii)  What  is  the net  impact of early retirement  programs  on  labour  supply, 
taking into account natural attrition of the  labour  force  in the  relevant  age 
groups.  (This  is basically a  routine calculation from  data  on demography  and 
participation rates  - but  I  do  not know  the extentto which  the  relevant data are 
readily available.) 
(iii) What  is  the net  impact of these  programs  on  employment,  taking into 
account normal  replacement  ratios at the  times  of normal  retirement.  (This  is a 
much  more  problematic calculation,  requiring new  microdata  on  replacements.) 
(iv)  How  the  answer  to  questions  (i)  and  (iii) is affected by  mandatory  re-
placement  provisons. 
(v)  What  are  the net budgetary costs  of alternative programs. -29-
While  await~ng results of further research  on  these points,  it see~s safe 
to  draw  two  conclusions  from  the British,  French  and  B.elgian experiences.  The 
first conclusion is  that a  mandatory  replacement provision seems  to make  a  cruciaZ 
difference in terms  of job  creation.  In contrast  to  the very high replacement  rates 
quoted  above  for  the  UK,  France  and  Belgium,  figures  as  low  as  10 or  20  % are 
reported  for  non-mandatory  programs,  for  instance in the  Netherlands;  see 
Commissariat  General  du  Plan  (1985). 
(These  figures  may  be partly illusory,  to  the extent  that one might  expect 
replacements  to be  staggered over  time,  with  the high mandatory  rates  concealing 
some  hirings  unrelated  to  the  scheme  and  the  low  voluntary rates  failing  to  take 
account of subsequent hirings.) 
The  second  conclusion is  that  the potential reduction  in the effective  labour 
supply of workers  under contract  through  early retirement is definitely substantial, 
as  witnessed by  the French  and  Belgian figures.  With  legal pension schemes  largely 
financed  through redistribution rather  than  through  accumulation,  the official 
retirement  age  is  (like standard working  time)  a  "public  good",  hopefully corre-
sponding  to  a  median worker's  preferences~  .  In that  case,  about half  the  labour 
force  should have  a  potential interest in early retirement,  at a  transitory income 
close  to  retirement  income,  with  the  proportion of volunteers  increasing smoothly 
with  the  income  replacement ratio.  Surveys  conducted  in France  and  the Netherlands 
confirm  these  common  sense observations 23  • 
In  the  same  way  that  the  attractiveness  of early retirement varies  across 
individuals, it also varies  across  firms.  One  important  aspect is  the  extent of 
seniority bonuses,  which  provide  an  inducement  to  replace senior workers  by  less 
costly beginners.  Another  aspect  is  the extent  to  which  firms  try  to  update  the 
skill composition of their work  force;  early retirements  provide  advance  opportuni-
ties  for  doing  so with  constant  employment. 
Further empirical  research,  of  the kind outlined above,  is  obvisouly 
needed  to assess  the practical limitations,  quantitative scope  and  budgetary 
implications  of.work sharing  through  early retirements. -30-
8.  SHARING  JOB  {Part-time  Work) 
This  form of work  sharing occurs  whenever a  single working  post is filled 
by  more  than one  person.  Two  separate  issues will be  considered under  this heading, 
namely  early retirement on  a  part-time basis with  replacement on  the  same  basis, 
and  part-time work  in general. 
8.1  Part-time early retirement 
In 1982,  the  UK  put an  end  to  the  "Job  Release  Scheme",  under which  several 
hundred  thousand  persons  had retired early and  many  job seekers  had been hired 
over a  5  years  span,  and  replaced  that  pro~ram by  a  "Job  Splitting Scheme",  under 
which  (among  other provisions}· a  worker  could retire early on a  half-time basis, 
and  be  replaced on  the  same  basis by an  unemployed.  After 12  months  of operation, 
the  Job  Splitting Scheme  had  covered  578  jobs! 
In 1983,  the  French  "Contrats  de  solidarite",  which  had been used  by 180.000 
persons  over a  two  years  span,  were  put  to an end,  and  replaced by  a  scheme 
offering incentives  to half-time early retirement with  replacement.  That  scheme, 
parallel  to  the British Job  Splitting Scheme,  was  equally  unsuccessful~. 
These  experiences  are definitely sobering,  for progressive  retirement would 
seem  to  convey  a  number  ·of  advantages  in comparison with abrupt  retirement.  When 
reporting on  the results  of  sample  polls about  the  preferences  of workers  regard-
ing  earnings  and working  time,  The  Conference  Board  in Europe  (1981)  notes  that 
diversity of preferences  is  the rule,  with  a  single exception where  a  large 
majority  emerged;  namely,  the  question on progressive retirement  in an  IFO  survey 
among  German  workers  in 1979:  70  % of Pespondents were  in favouP  of pPogpessive 
retiPement! 
The  apparent  failure  of progressive  retirement  schemes  in France  and  the  L~ 
should  be  considered  in the  light of broader  trends  concerning part-time work. 
8.2  Part-time work 
Some  data  about  part-time work  in Europe  are  collected  in  the  Appendix.  The 
more  striking features  revealed  by  these  data are  the  following: 
{i)  Part-time workers  are almost  exclusively women;  the  percentage of  men 
working  regularly on a  part-time basis  is  extremely  small;  although  that  percentage 
has  grown  somewhat  in  recent  years,  the  growth  is  accounted  for  by  older workers  or 
younger  workers  in special  programs;  there is little or no  indication of systematic 
job sharing among  men. -31-
(ii)  The  percentage of women  working regularly on  a  part-time basis varies 
substantially across  countries,  ranging  from  4Q-45  % in such countries  as  the 
UK  and  Denmark,  down  to  20  % or less  in France  and  Belgium;  variations across 
countries are much  more  pronounced than variations over time. 
(iii)  High  percentages  of part-time work  tend  to be associated with above 
average  labour  force participation rates,  for  women;  when  participation rates  are 
translated into  full-time equivalents,  their variability across  countries  is  sharply 
reduced.  This  observation suggests  that promoting part-time work  would  increase 
participation rates,  so  that  the  increased employment  would  not be matched by  a  com-
mensurate  frurr  inunemployment;  nor would it be  matched by  a  commensurate  increase  in 
aggregate  labour  input. 
(iv)  In a  country  like  the  UK,  where part-time work  of women  is wide-spread, 
the percentage  of part-time workers  varies  substantially with age  and  family  com-
position.  This  1s  consistent with  the hypothesis  that  the extent of part-time work 
largely reflects  the preferences  of workers,  accommodated  by  the  firms,  rather than 
the  other way  around.  A more  conclusive  test of that hypothesis  would be welcome, 
but is not  easy  to construct.  Also,  preferences  for working  time  expressed by  survey 
respondents  in other countries  (like  Germany  and  France),  where  part-time work  is  less 
wide-spread,  imply  a  desired percentage of part-time work  close  to  the  40-45  % 
observed  in the  UK  and  Denmark.  Furthermore,  in a  country like France with little 
part-time work,  the  percentage of part-time workers  has  increased recently  (after 
1980),  and  the  increase has  been uniform across  industries.  On  the  other hand,  in a 
country  like  the  UK,  the  percentage of part-time work  is stationary.  These  observa-
tions  are again consistent with  the hypothesis  that high  rates of  part-time work 
reflect worker  preferences,  with  less  (but  growing)  accommodation of  these preferences 
(by  firms,  or unions,  or both)  in the  countries  where  part-time work  is less  developed. -32-
(v)  In all countries,  part-time work  is more  wide-spread  in services  than in 
industry.  In all sectors,  it is  concentrated in jobs entailing less  responsibility 
and  requiring lower qualifications.  Hourly earnings  of part-time workers  are  lower 
than  those  of full-time workers. 
(vi)  Hours  worked  by  part-time workers  are  largely concentrated at or near  the 
half-time mark.  Yet,  there  is a  potential  supply of  part-time work  near  the  30 hours, 
three quarter  time,  mark.That  supply  does  not  seem  to be  matched by  a  corresponding 
demand. 
(vii)  An  attempt was  made  in 1984  in the  Benelux countries  to hire public 
servants  on an 80  %,  4  days-a-week,  basis.  No  systematic report on that experiment 
is available yet.  Casual  evidence  suggests  that it was  not ver-y  successful, 
due  to  insufficient reorganisation of work.  That  experiment clearly deserves  further 
study. 
8.3  The  conclusion emerging  from  this brief survey  l§  fairly clear.  Job  sharing 
through  part-time work  has  not developed  in Europe  as  a  means  of work  sharing  to 
alleviate cyciical unemployment.  It has  not  spread  among  men.  The  countries where part-
time  employment  of women  is  growing are  the  countries where  that form of  employment  is 
still abnormally  infrequent,  and  where  one would  expect it to  spread  irrespective  of 
the  recession. 
Although  I  have not  seen hard data,  I  suspect that part-time work has  not been 
used either as  a  means  of work  sharing for workers  under contract in firms  with 
declining employment. 
The  reasons  seem  to lie with  a  natural preference for  full-time  contracts, 
shared by  firms  and  male  workers;  and  with  a  lack of flexibility in providing for 
part-time  jobs  on  a  more~than-half-time basis. 
Indeed,  if job  sharing were  to be  used  systematically as  a  way  of  absorbing 
fluctuations  in the  supply of  regular  jobs,  a  natural  approach would  consist in 
promoting new  hirings  on a  75  %or 80  %basis,  combined with reorganisation of  work 
aimed at extending simultaneouslythe rate of utilisation of capital.  The  latter 
measures  would be particularly appropriate at times  where  spare  capacity is scarce. 
Some  speculative  remarks  on that  theme  are offered in Section 10.3. -33-
9.  TRADING  HOURS  FOR  JOBS  (The  Working  Week) 
9.1  In the  long  run,  reductions  in hours  worked have  been an  important  component of 
welfare gains,  accounting for  something like  25% of overall gains  by  a  crude 
estimate 
25 
•  At  the  same  time,  these  reductions have  played  an important role in 
reconciling full  employment  with productivity gains.(See Tables  1  and  2  above.) 
(Of  course,  the  respective extents  to which  shorter hours  have been permitted by, 
or have  triggered,  technological  progress  are not separately  identified.} 
These  are  long-run  trends.  The  question  of  interest here  is  short-run 
fluctuations.  During recessions,  hopefully viewed  as  temporary,  could  one  stimulate 
employment  (create  jobs)  by antiCip-ating  trend  re.duc.tions  in hours?  Offhand,  this  is 
a  tempting  suggestion.  In practice,  it seems  difficult to  implement.  It was  tried 
in France  in the  thirties, with little practical  impact  on effective working  time, 
and  a  questionable  immediate  impact  on  employment.  Over  the .past decade,  the  theme 
of  a  35  hours  week  has  been  the subject of much  controversy,  enlivened for  instance by 
the  strike of German  metal workers  in 1979 or by official pronouncements  (of the 
Belgian Government  in 1978,  of  the  French Government  in 1981, ..•  ).  As  of  today,  there 
is  no  indication that stimulating employment  through shorter hours  is feasible  on a 
significant scale  in the short run,  and  longer-run effects  remain subject  to  much 
uncertainty.  At  best,  the nature  of  the difficulties associated with  this  approach 
become  progressively better understood. 
I  begin by  reviewing  the  theoretical arguments  for  and  against  this  approach, 
then summarise  the  more  recent experience. 
9.2  The  theoretical  ground  for  advocating shorter hours  during  a  prolonged recession 
is of course  the  prospect for  correcting the  inefficient distribution of work between 
employees  under  contract and  job  seekers. (!twas  explained  in Section 4  why  the 
market  fails  to  generate  an efficient allocation.)  If a  given number  of hours  is 
to  be  shared more  efficiently between  the  two  groups, it seems  natural  to  impose 
shorter hours  on workers  under contract, with  identical hours  for  them and  for 
newcomers.(At  least,  this  is more  natural  than  laying off workers  under  contract  to hire 
newcomers.)Hopefully  (wishfully?),  new  hirings  might occur in the  same  proportion that 
hours  are  reduced. -~-
There  is an important qualification,  however.  The  logic of implicit contract 
theory is  that firms  should use  labour  up  to  the point where  its marginal value 
product  is  equal  to  the  opportunity cost of workers,  which  is  typically well  below 
the  full wage  cost  to  firms  in a  recession.  That  logic applies  to workers  under 
contract - not  to  newcomers,  who  are hired only when  their marginal  value  product 
covers  their full wage  cost.  Consequently,  if hours  of workers  under contract are 
reduced,  firms  operating at a  marginal value product of  labour below full wage  costs 
will not hire  replacements,  unless  the  reduction in hours  is  sufficient to bring 
the marginal value product of labour  up  to.the full wage  cost.  Put more  simply,  firms 
engaged in labour hoarding will not respond to shorter hours  by  new  hirings,  for  the 
same  reason that  they do  not offset natural attrition of their work  force by new 
hirings.  (Also,  such firms will show  relatively little reluctance  to  reduce hours, 
since  they have  excess  labour anyhow.)  Shorter hours will induce  additional hirings 
only in thosB  firms  ~hich are already  hiring3  to offset quits or expand  employment. 
Such  firms  are  a  minority during  a  prolonged recession;  and  they are  concentrated in 
specific sectors H. 
Also,  these  firms  will  show  great reluctance  to  reduce  hours.  In order  to  in-
crease  employment,  it might be  preferable  to  create  incentives  for  these  firms  to 
hire newcomers  on  a  part-time basis  - say on  a  75  % or 80  % basis,  with  the  prospect 
of  switching  to  full-time work  in these  expanding  firms  as  the pressure of unemploy-
ment  abates. 
Of  course,  had  the  newcomers  been part of a  market  clearing process  ex ante, 
so  they would  be  part of  the  labour hoarding  today,  and  shorter hours  would  be  an 
attractive alternative  to  layoffs.  The  problem is again one  of asymmetry  between 
sharing work  among  workers under contract,  versus  sharing work  between workers  under 
contract and  the  unemployed. 
To  overcome  that asymmetry  (to bridge the  gap  between  the marginal value product 
of labour  and  full wage  costs),  one  may  consider  the more  radical measure  of shorter 
hours  with mandatory new  hirings.  That  is,  one  may  consider  imposing  on  each firm that 
it should  increase  employment  by  a  fixed percentage,  while  reducing hours  for all. -35-
Clearly,  measures  of  that kind entail a  high  degree  of  arbitrariness  and  are 
difficult to  implement.  To  say  that new  entrants  into the  labour force  would  have 
a  job  today,  if they  had  been able  to contract yesterday,  is not  to  say that  the 
employment  in every  firm  would  thereby be  increased in the  same  proportion.  (That 
arbitrariness would be alleviated,  but not  eliminated,  if the hiring obligations 
were  tradable  among  firms.)  Also,  wages  today would  be different,  and  so  on.  Only 
if the measure  under  discussion had been fully anticipated  could  one  claim that it 
is non-discriminatory;  but existence of a  rational expectations  equilibrium under 
proportional quantity constraints  is open  to question.  And  it is clear that once 
such  a  measure  is announced  as  a  contingent plan,  it will discourage  normal hirings  to 
an extent which  could be quite harmful. 
Two  additional pit-falls of  a  mandatory  general  reduction in hours  should be 
mentioned 27 •  The  first concerns  effectiv~ hours  of plant utilisation.  In firms 
operating one  or  two  shifts  for  a  conventional number  of hours,  reducing  weekly hours 
is apt  to result simply in reduced  plant utilisation and  output,  with no  effect on 
employment.  (A  typical  example  is offered by  automobile plants working  two  shifts, 
with little or no  possibility of keeping plant hours  c~nstant when  weekly  schedules 
of workers  are reduced  by  a  few  hours.)  It is only when  the  number  of shifts is 
simultaneously increased that employment will rise naturally.  (The  limiting example 
is  offered by  plants  operated  on  a  continuous basis,  where  shorter hours  per worker 
entail  the need  of additional  employment.) 
The  second pit-fall concerns  effective wage  costs.  If shorter hours  result 
in higher hourly wage  costs,  whatever positive effects  on employment  may  be  associated 
with work  time  reduction must  be  weighed  against  the negative effects associated with 
the wage  increases.  These  may  have  two  sources.  On  the  one  hand,  effective wage  costs 
may  rise due  to  the  fixed  costs  of hiring and  training,  now  spread  over  fewer hours; 
and  due  to  the  capital costs, .similarly spread over  fewer  hours  if plant utilisation 
is  linked  to  the working  schedules  of employees.  On  the other hand,  workers  on shorter 
hours  may  attempt  to protect their disposable  income  by  claiming higher hourly wages, 
and  a  less  than proportional  reduction in take home  pay. -36-
The  risk that shorter hours result in higher effective wage  costs will be 
tempered  by  the extent to which  employment-conscious  unions  substitute hiring claims 
for wage  claims.  The  difficult question,  ultimately,  is  to assess  the  long-run in-
cidence of hours  worked  on effective wage  costs.  The  instantaneous.increases arising 
from shorter hours  at unchanged  take  home  pay may  be partly compensated by  slower 
wage  increases  thereafter.  Whereas  the  instantaneous  wage  moderation  accompanying 
demands  for  more  employment  may  be  partly compensated  by  catching up  later.  In either 
case,  speculati-on about  future wage  patterns  is needed  to  draw  firm conclusions. 
Finally,  there is a  presumption that many  firms  are able  to offset a  gradual 
reduction in weekly  hours  by  productivity  increases without  new  hirings. 
9.3  The  salient features  of recent European experience with hours  worked  per week 
seem  to be  the  following. 
(i)  Over  the past 10 years,  average hours  worked have  declined,  whether measured 
per week or per year  - see Tables  5  and  6 •  The  main explanation for  this decline 
lies  in  the near  disappearance of overtime work.  On  the  one hand,  there was  less need 
for overtime work,  due  to the  depressed  demand  for  output.  On  the other hand,  unions 
d  .  d  .  k  .  d  .  1  h"  .  28  an  governments  d1scourage  overt1me  wor  ,  1n or er to  st1mu ate  new  1r1ngs  • 
(ii)  In  those  cases where  a  reduction in hours  with mandatory  new  hirings has 
been put  forward,  it has  met with  adamant  opposition from  employers.  Thus,  a  proposal 
by  the  Belgian Government  in 1979  to subsidise  a  reduction of  the  standard working week 
from  40  to  38  hours  with  new  hirings  corresponding  to  3  % of extant employment,  was 
rejected by  the  employers  and  some  unions 
29 
•  When  offered to individual  firms  on a 
voluntary basis,  the  proposal  met  with negligible  success.  In France,  the  "contrats 
de  solidarite" offered in 1982  inducements  to  new  hirings offsetting either reductions 
in working  time  or early retirements;  out of some  12.500 contracts  signed by 
september  30,  1982,  only  4.5  % were  concerned with reduction of working  time,  and 
10  times  as  many  new  hirings resulted  from early retirements  as  from  shorter hours
30
• 
(iii) Where  a  reduction in standard hours  was  introduced without  mandatory  new 
hirings,  it seems  to  have  been conducive  to very  few  new  hi'rings  in the short run-
with  one  exception mentioned  below.  At  least,  those  who  have  looked .for evidence of 
the  new  hirings  do  not seem  to have  found it. Such  was  the  case,  in particular,  for 
surveys  conducted  in Belgium in 1980  and  more  recently in France 31  •  The  only clear 
cases  of new  hirings  came  from  firms  operating on a  continuous basis with  several 
shifts.  Shorter hours  per shift necessarily  implied  some  (less  than proportional) 
h .  .  32  new  1r1ngs  • -37-
Full-time  All  Employees  Blue-Collar Workers 
1974  1982  1932/1974  1974  1982  1982/1974 
Belgium  1620  1470  .910  1700  1500  .884 
Denmark  1830  1760  .961  n.a. 
France  1780  1610  .905  1820  1700  .936 
Germany  1820  1690  .931  1740  1640  . 941 
Italy  1700  1600  .949  1690  1650  .979 
Netherlands  1720  1650  .959  1790  1670  •  931 
U.K.  1910  1800  .944  1770  1620  . 917 
Sweden  1740  1590  .913  1630  1530  .938 
Canada  1920  1880  .979  1830  1720  .938 
u.s.  1950  1900  .975  1710  1610  .940 
Japan  2090  2120  1.015  2100  2080  .992 
TABLE  5.  Annual  hours  worked,  1974-1982 
Source  Commissariat  General  du  Plan,  Amenagement  et Reduction  du 
Temps  de  Travail,  Paris,  La  Documentation  Fran~aise,  1985, 
p.  75. 
(from  OECD  data) 
1972  1975  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Belgium  41.7  37.1  37.6  38. I  35.7  35.9  34.9 
France  45.0  42.4  41.3  41.1  40.9  40.6  39.4 
Germany  43.2  40.9  42.0  42. 1  41.6  41.3  40.0 
Ireland  - 42.2  43.4  43.4  42.3  42.5  41.7 
Italy  41.9  41.5  39.4  39.7  38.4  38._6  37.5 
Luxemburg  43.9  40.9  40.2  40.8  40.2  40.6  39.0 
Netherlands  43.9  40.8  41.1  41.1  40.8  40.7  40.6 
U.K.  43.0  41.8  42.2  42.0  40.7  41.4  41.4 
TABLE  6. 
Source  Eurostat'  "Gains horai res, duree  du  travai  1  II,. 2'  1983. -38-
These  findings  are sobering,  and  confirm the  theoretical warnings  that reductions 
in hours will not  create many  jobs  in the  short run.  At  the  same  time,  there is a 
presumption  that shorter hours  per week  somehow  imply more  jobs  in the  long run -
other  things  equal.  The  reasoning calls on arithmetic •••• The  analogy with wages 
is instructive.  The  short-run elasticity of  employment  with respect  to real wages  is 
generally believed small,  whereas  the  long-run elasticity at constant output  should 
be  close  to unity  on grounds  of constant factor  shares.  Similarly,  the  short-run 
elasticity of  employment with  respect  to hours  per week- is apparently small,  for  the 
reasons just indicated,  whereas  the  long-run elasticity should  be  close  to unity on 
grounds  of arithmetic.  Both  arguments  of course  assume  that productivity,  technology 
and output are  unrelated  to wages  or hours;  and  departures  from  these  assumptions  may 
well  prove  significant in the  long  run. 
This  is an area where  uncertainties are substantial.  Several  attempts  have  been 
made  to.throw some  light on  the  issue by  simulating macroeconomic  models;  see,  for 
instance  Charpin  and  Mairesse  (1978),  Driehuis  and  Bruyn  (1979)  or  Plasmans  (1985). 
Simulationstypically compare  employment  forecasts  with  and without  reduction in weekly 
hours,  under alternative assumptions  about wage  developments.  Sometimes;  explicit 
hypotheses  about  the elasticity of output with  respect  to hours  are also  introduced. 
My  own  attitude towards  these  simulations  is  one of polite scepticism.  Too  little 
is  known  about  the elasticity of  employment  with  res9ect  to  ~yeekly hours in a context of 
general  recession  for  these  simulations  to be reliable.  Estimates  of production 
functions where  hours  and  number  of  employees  appear as  separate arguments,based on time 
series data  covering  the past  thirty years,are not apt  to  measure  that elasticity 
accurately.  Apd  I  have  not  seen estimates based on recent  microeconomic  data. 
Accordingly,  I  regard  the  fragmentary  information from  the  surveys  mentioned  under 
(ii)  above  as  more  instructive,  for  short-run purposes;  and  I  refrain from  drawing 
long-run conclusions. -39-
10.  POLICY  PROSPECTS  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
10.1  Hopefully,  Part  I  of  this  essay may  have  convinced  the reader that:  (i)  some  form 
of work  sharing would  be called for  to absorb  efficiently sizeable fluctuations  in the 
demand  for  labour;  (ii) market  institutions fail  to organise work  sharing between 
workers  under contract.  and  job seekers,  or among  job seekers  themselves;  (iii) there 
is scope  for public  intervention in correcting that market failure  through  promotion of 
work  sharing during deep  recessions. 
It is thus  not surprising that interest in work  sharing as  a  means  to alleviate 
unemployment  should be lively in Europe  today  and  that a  set of specific measures 
meant  to  promote  work  sharing should have been  introduced by  European governments. 
The  brief review of our experience with  these measures  in Part II reveals  that: 
(i)  early retirement  schemes  with  some  form of  income.maintenance have pulled large 
numbers  of senior workers  out of  the  labour  force,  and have  led to  roughly commensurate 
numbers  of new  hirings when  and  only when  the  schemes  specified mandatory replacements; 
(ii) part-time work  has  not  spread as  a  means  of sharing work  among  job  s~ekers, or 
between job  seekers  and  workers  under contract  (the total failure of part-time early 
retirement schemes  being particularly striking);  (iii) _those  who  have  looked  for 
evidence of  job  creations  induced by  reductions  in weekly  hours  have not  found  any 
appreciable short-run.effects;  this leaves  open  the question of potential longer-run 
effects,  a  question surrounded by  the  related uncertainties of capital utilisation, 
wage  costs  and  productivity adjustments. 
These  empirical  findings  are generally consistent with  theoretical considerations, 
to  the extent that:  (i)  the  (positive)  value of holding a  regular  job varies substantial-
ly across  individuals  and  over an  individual's wotking life,  suggesting  in particular 
that a  substantial proportion of  the members  of  the older generations  could be  induced 
at little cost  to hand over their jobs·  to  new  recruits;  (ii)  the  fixed costs of hiring 
and  training deter firms  from  using part-time labour,  outside of  special  circum-
stances  (like  peak  loads within  the week),  whereas  enough  workers  eager to work  full 
time  are  forthcoming;  (iii) firms  engaged  in labour hoarding,  which  may  well be in 
a  majority  during  deep  recessions,  will not respond  to  shorter hours  (or  lower wages,  . 
for  that matter)  by  new  hirings;  and  firms  which  are hiring new  employees will resist 
reductions  in hours. -.40-
It is always  comforting  for  an economist  to  reconcile facts· with  theore.tical 
predictions.  And  it is definitely useful  to  understand better why  some .measures 
prove relatively effective and  others  do  not.  Looking  at the  issue of work  sharing 
from  the  viewpoint  of contracts  for regular  jobs  seems  helpful  on that score. 
At  the same  time,  it is discomforting  to be left with a  situation where  clearly 
identified market failures  offer scope  for  Pareto  improvements  through inter-
vention,  but where  the effectiveness of intervention is limited in the short run. 
Such  a  situation seems  to prevail on  the work-sharing front. 
10.2  The  immediate  implications of this essay for policy purposes  are  the  following: 
(i)  Early retirement with mandatory replacement  stands  out as  the most  promis-
ing approach  to work  sharing in the short run;  in several countries,  that approach 
has  hardly been used,  and  offers a  genuine prospect  for  some  alleviation of un-
employment  - of  youth  unemployment,  if replacements  are reserved  for  the  young; 
more  detailed work  aimed  at quantifying that prospect,  both  numberwise  and  costwise, 
should be  encouraged  (or discovered,  to  the extent that it may  exist unbeknown  to 
me);  specific questions  have been raised  in Section 7.2. 
(ii) Shorter weekly hours  stand out as  the  least promising and  most  uncertain 
approach  to work  sharing in the short run;  at least,  that approach  should not be 
used  undiscriminately; it will produce positive employment  effects  in those 
sectors.  (in~ludi~g metal working?)  where  plants are operated on  a  continuous basis, 
it wilt p~Qduce negative output effects without  gains-in employment  in those 
sectors where hours  ~f plant utilisation are given by  the working week;  and  longer-
run effects will be negative if shorter hours  imply higher effective hourly wage 
costs. 
(iii) If one  accepts  the view  that firms  engaged  in labour hoarding will not 
respond  to either lower wages  or shorter hours  by  new  hirings,  one  should concentrate 
the  promotion of work  sharing on  expanding  and  new  firms;  in these  firms,  part-time 
work  by  the  new  employees  may  well be  the  more  natural patternof work  sharinP,. 
(iv)  Part-time work  stands  out as  the  most  disappointing approach  to work 
sharing,  in the sense  that its potential to alleviate unemployment,  which  could  be 
substantial, has  not been exploited at all in the  re·cent  European  ex-perience. 
This. is all the more  disappointing since part-time early retirement would  seem  so 
much  more  natural and  appealing than abrupt early retirement;  given  the substantial 
measure of success met  by early retirement  programs  and  the overwhelming interest 
expressed by workers  for gradual retirement,  it is doubly disappointing to  obs.erve 
the  total failure of  the  timid attempts  in that direction.  Although  efforts  to 
promote part-time work  are bound  to be  slow in producing  their· effects,  because 
they call for substantial reorganisation of work,  such efforts are worth  under-
taking in a  long-run perspective. -41-
10.3  From  the  longer-run viewpoint,  three  interrelated questions must be  faced, 
to which  only speculative answers  can be  given today: 
{i)  How  long will it take  to restore a  measure  of full  employment  in Europe 
(say,  with unemployment  rates  for  the young of 5  % or so)? 
(ii) Will  the historical  trend  towards  a  shorter working week  maintain itself 
in the  future? 
(iii)  How  seriously should we  entertain the prospect of other deep recessions, 
comparable  to  those of  the thirties and  the eighties,  in the  future? 
If one  fears  that full employment will not be restored in Europe  for several 
years  to  come  (and  this is my  personal reading of  the  EEC  for~ts), and  that deep 
recessions  may  occur again  (for the  reasons  explained in Section 3),  then one  should 
look  seriously at part-time work as  a  means  of sharing jobs during  such  recessions. 
If in addition one  fails  to  see why  the historical trend  towards  shorter hours 
should  come  to  a  halt,  then one  should  (in my  opinion)  take seriously the  issue of 
maintaining  the periods  of use  of capital and of provision of services.  Indeed, 
as  the working week  becomes  shorter, it is increasingly  important  to  uncouple 
individual working hours  from  the period of business activity  (over which capital 
is used  and  services are provided).  For otherwise  overhead costs will creep up,  and 
the benefits of additional  leasure will be  ~artly offset by  the  deterioration in 
availability of services.  This  remark is linked  to  the previous  one because un-
coupling individual working hours  from  the period of business activity is bound 
to open  up  new  prosp~cts for  part-time  work~ at a  gain in overall efficiency as 
well  as  in labour-markets  flexibility. 
A number  of  schemes  to that effect have been proposed,  ranging  from  the 
generalisation of half-day shifts  6  days  a  wee~ to rotating vacation periods  of up 
to  3  months  per year
33
•  The  most  appealing  scheme  to my  mind  would be  a  generalisa-
tion of  the  4  days  working week with  6  days  of activity.  A working post  then corre-
sponds  to  either one  full-time  and  one half-time job,  or  two  75  % jobs,  or  three 
half-time  jobs  - or one  and  a  half full-time  jobs with  three  full-timers  filling 
two  working  posts.  Aside  from  the  obvious  advantages  of reducing  commuting  time 
for workers  by  20  % and  increasing  the use of capital by  up  to  35  % (6  days  of  9 
hours  versus  5  days  of  8  hours),  this  scheme  would  generate flexibility in the 
provision of  part-time work,  especially  on  a  75% basis.  Hopefully,  it would 
also generate flexibility in the  provision of part-time early retirement,  and 
facilitate  job  sharing  through  part-time work  among  the  new  employees  of  expanding 
and  new  firms.  A new  perspective would  thus  be  opened  for resorting  to part-time 
work  as  a  means  of work  sharing  to  absorb  fluctuations  in the markets  for regular 
jobs.  A theme  of  the present paper  is  that  such  a  perspective is needed,  but not 
esay  to  find •.•• -42-
Of  course,  a  4-days  week  with  6  days  of activity is  a  highly speculative as  well 
as  controversial proposal.  It is speculative,  because we  lack solid information, 
beyond  the  isolated experience  of a  few  firms  which have  chosen to  operate on  that 
basis  (for reasons  of their  own)~  •  And  it is controversial, because  six days  of 
activity means  saturday work  {typically  two  weeks  out of  three)  and  a  reversal  of 
the  trend  towards  longer week-ends  with  less  and  less organised activity then.  Revers-
ing that trend has  an  obvious  welfare  cost,  to be  weighed  against  the  associated 
efficiency gains.  On  the  other hand,  it may  be  indispensable  to protect  the  period  of 
activity and  use  of capital, if the working week  is  to be  reduced  further;  and  it may 
be natural  to reduce working  time  further  as  technological  progress  accelerates •••• 
I  have  no  particular authority to discuss  this speculative proposal.  But  I  may 
refer back  to  two  points  made  earlier, which  are  of relevance here.  The  first is  that, 
in a  world where  firms  and  (male)  workers  have  a  common  preference  for  full-time 
regular  jobs,  temporary  reliance  on  75  % jobs  when  there is excess  supply of  labour 
will require  inducements  of some  kind or other. It is achallenging task to  think 
through  a  coherent approach  to  this  issue.  The  open questions  are  numerous,  and  the 
answers  are not obvious.  At  a  time when  only  3  out of 4  new  entrants  into  the  labour 
force  are  employed,  if one  had  a  4  days  week  with  6  days  of activity,  should  one 
penalise full-time work,  or subsidise part-time work,  or both?  If there  is  a  penalty, 
should it be  levied on  the  employer or  the  employee,  or is  that issue  immaterial? 
Should hours  above  the  average effectively worked,  counting  the  unemployed,  carry 
social security benefits,  like rights  to  pensions  and  unemployment  compensation? 
A whole  set of  intriguing question arise,  which  require  a  logic combinrngex ante 
risk sharing considerations  and  incentives  considerations. 
The  second  point made  earlier  (Section 5)  is  that a  major  reorganisation of work 
involves  numerous  externalities  and  therefore calls  for guidelines  and  coordination 
from  the  public sector.  In particular,  a  4  days  week  with  6  days  of activity requires 
a  new  coordination between production activities,  services,  leasure activities, 
schools,  etc •••. Such  coordination can only  evolve  over  time,  and  is facilitated if 
the  new  pattern is known  ahead  of  time.  It also  involves  the  public sector directly, 
through  the  provision of public services.  It would  certainly make  sense at this  time 
for  the  post office,  administrative services  open  to ·the public  and  the  like,  to 
consider six days  of activity,  with  more  reliance  on  part-time workers. 
This  may  well  be  the  only  fruitful  direction in which  thinking  about  the working 
~eek should  be  orientated.  As  I-said~ the·suggestion is speculative,  at  best~.And it is 
not  clear that governments  are  able  to  implement  such  far-reaching policies.  But  there 
are  obvious merits  to channelling the  current debate  about  work  sharing in those  direc-
tiornwhich  experience  and  theory  alike  suggest  as  the  more  realistic. -43-
APPENDIX:  PART-TIME  WORK  IN  EUROPE 
(The  6"sections of this appendix correspond  to paragraphs i-vi in Section 8.2 
of the text.) 
A.l  An  overview of  the extent of part-time work  in Europe,  and  of  trendsover 
the last decade,  is presented  in Table  7,  which  gives  the proportion of employees 
working part  time,  for men  and  women,  in 9  European countries,  over  the period 
1973-1983.  The  perc~ntages for  men  are  uniformally  low,  and hardly rising.  The 
percentages for women  are  10  times  as  high,  on average,  and  r1s1ng  in some  but 
not all countries.  The  share of women  in the  total number  of  part~time employees 
is accordingly high in all countries  (Table  8). 
A further  indication is provided by Table  9,  which  gives,  for  the single 
yea,r  19'83,'  the  perc~ntage of part-time workers  in 4 -age  groups,  separately for 
men,  and women,in- the  same  countries  (plus  Greece).  The  contrast between the situa-
tion for men  and women  is  now  much  sharper.  Rates  of part-time work  for men  are 
lowest in the_ ~'pi:ime  age"  group  (25-49),  highest after retirement age,  and next 
highest among  the young  (14-24).  For women,  the  same  rates are rising continuously 
with age;  in the prime age  group,  they  stand uniformly  above  the average rates of 
Table  7. 
A.2  Tables  7  and  9  reveal  that the  percentage of active women  working part time 
varies substantlally across  countries,  ranging  from  4D-45  % in the  UK  and  Denmark 
down  to  20% in France and.Belgium.  One  would  like to understand  the nature and  the 
causes  of  these inter-country differences. 
A.3  A first observation is that high rates of part-time work  tend  to be 
aecompa~ied by  high rates of labour  force participation.  Table  10 lists side by 
side the gross  labour- force participation rates  (GPR)  for nine countries  and  the 
propqrtion of employed  women  working part  time  (PPT).  The  data are reproduced in 
Figure 1,  together with the regression line GPR  = 16  +  .• 43  PPT.  In order  to 
compute  an adjusted  labour  force participation rate  (APR),  I  have  treated part-time 
employees  as  if they worked  half-time,  and  assumed  identical unemployment  rates  among 
full-time  and  part-time workers.  The  results of  the  computations  are  given in 
column  (3).  Figure  2  reproduces  the data on  APR  and  PPT,  together with  the 
regression line  APR  = 18  +  .2  PPT  (~-1here the  coefficient  • 2  is not significant). 
Thus,  adjusted participation rates are not  significantly affected.by  the extent 
of part-time work.  The  relationship  of  gross  to average participation rates is 
depicted  in Figure 3,  where  the regression line GPR  =  - 4  +  1.35 APR  gives 
a  very good  fit. -44-
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A.4  In all countries,  labour  force participation rates  of women  vary with age 
and marital status  (Table 11);  these variations are quite systematic.  (In the 
age  group  14-24,  married women  display  the highest participation rates;  in the 
age  group  25-49,  single women  display the highest rate, married  women  the lowest; 
after  50,  the  rates  for married women,  and  for widows  or divorcees  are  equal.) 
In the  UK,  the high percentage of part-time women  workers  conceals  substantial 
differences related  to marital status.  Table  12  reveals  a  percentage of  50  % for 
married  women,  as  against  20%  for.unmarried women.  The  difference is most  pro-
nounced at young  ages  and  declines  steadily to near equality in old age.  Equally 
striking differences  emerge  in Table  13,  where  the variables  of  classification 
are marital status and  the  age  of  the  youngest  child-.  Married women  with young 
children are most  inclined to work  part time,  unmarried  women  with no  young  children 
are least inclined  to  do  so.  It seems  difficult to  impute all these differences  to 
the behaviour of  employees,  and  much  more ·natural  to see  them  as  reflecting workers 
preferences. 
Survey data about  preferred working  time,  collected in countries where part-
time work  is  less prevalent,  point  towards  the  same  conclusion.  Thus,  in a  survey 
conducted  in Germany  in 1978  (the results of which. are  summarised  in Table 14), 
some  40  % of women  respondents  expressed  a  preference  for working  less  than  35  hours 
a  week.  (The  corresponding percentage for  men  is  14  %).  40%  is very close to  the 
actual  percentage  in the  UK.  Analysing  the results of  a  survey  conducted  in France 
in the  same  year,  Baroin  (1982,  p.  36)  concludes  that  the  percentage of active 
women  working part time  could easily double,  if the  demand  for  that kind of  jobs 
were  accommodated 35  •  (Because  60% of  the  increase would  come  from  women  switching 
from  full-time  to  part-time work,  no  change  in output is at stake.)  If doubled,the 
percentage of  employed  women  working  part  time  in France would  come  close  to  the 
actual British level. 
One  naturally wonders  whether  the  growth  in the rate of part-time work  of 
women  in countries  like Belgium,  France  and  Germany  is  due  to  a  generalisation of 
that pattern of work,  or whether it simply  reflects  the more  rapid  growth  of  sectors 
(like retail trade)  where  that pattern is more  prevalent.  French  data,  available 
annually  for  38  sectors,  answer  that question unequivocally:  the  proportion of 
part-time workers  for  1983  is  the same,  whether  the proportions  in individual 
sectors  are weighted by  employment  for  the  sector in 1983,  in 1980 or in 1975 
(namely,  .200,  .198  and  .197);  the  same  results hold  for  services  (namely,  .209, 
.208  and  .209)  and  nearly  so  for  industry  (.113,  .112  and  .107) ·(See  Table  15.) 
There  is thus  clear evidence  of  an  econom)7'·7ide  seneral  i sa  tion of  p.ar.t-t  ime  work, 
probably reflecting growing  accommodation  of workers  preferences. -%-
A.5  The  higher rates of part-time work  in services  than in industry apply to all 
European countries,  and  to men  as well  as women;  see Table  16  (where  the single 
diverging observation concerns men  in Greece). 
The  facts  that part-time workers hold  jobs  of lesser responsibility  (Table  17), 
requiring less  education  (Table 18)  and  yielding  lower  pay  (Table  19)  seem  fairly 
robust.  In particular,  they are verified across  sectors  or occupations. 
A.6  Data  on  h~urs worked  by  women _employees  with regular part-time  jobs  (Table  20) 
reveal  a  high  concentration  (45  to  50% )near the  20  hours  mark  and  a  very  low 
concentration in the  3Q-34  hours  range.  The  country data  (not  reproduced,  but 
available  from  the  same·source)  are homogeneous  in that  res~ect. This  may  be  con-
trasted with  the expressed  preferences  of  Table  14.  Interpreting  the  preference for 
35  hours  or more  as  a  preference for  full-time work,  one would  be left with more 
than 50% of  the part-time workers  in the  3Q-34  hours  range  (20.6 out of 38.7 
percent of  the  sample).  It would  seem  that women  eager  to work  30  to  34  hours  end 
up  either working half  time  or working full  time  - probably due  to  lack of opportu-
nities. M
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1972  1975  1977  1979  1981  1983 
Belgium  82.4  85.1  87.0  89.3  85.8  84.0 
Denmark  - 86.8  85.4  86.9  86.9  84.7 
France  77.9  78.0  78.8  82.0  83.3  84.6 
Germany  89.0  89.6  90.5  91.6  91.9  91.9 
Ireland  - 71.4  73.7  71.2  - 70.7 
Italy  58.3  58.7  61.3  61.4  61.4  64.8 
Luxemburg  83.3  85.7  83.3  87.5  - 80.0 
Netherlands*  80.2  81.4  81.1  82.5  69.4  78.3 
U.K.  90.9  91.5  91.9  92.8  89.6  89.6 
-------------·-----------------------
Europe  9  - 84.7  85.3  86.8  84.8  85.1 
TABLE  8.  Proportion of women  conong  vart-time employees 
Source  :  Eurostat,  "Labour  Force Sample  Surveys",  EmpZoi  et  Ch0rrr:1.ge,  2,  1985. 
*In the Netherlands,  a  change  in the  definitions  occured  between  1979  and  1981. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands 
U.K. 
--------
Europe  10 
; 
M  E N  W  0 M  E N 
14-24  25-49  50-64  65  up  14-24  25-49  50-64  65  up 
3.8  1.4  1.9  18.8  14.7  20.4  23.2  37.5 
20.2  2.7  4.8  20.5  30.2  44.5  54.4  46.5 
4.5  1.4  3.0  37.6  14.4  19.6  25.2  39.2 
1.5  0.9  1.6  39.4  6.0  36.7  36.5  55.7 
6.7  2.4  3.3  16.7  10. I  10.9  13.0  51.4 
5.8  1.6  2.6  - 6.9  19.4  27.3  -
3.7  1.1  3.1  25.3  7.8  29.8  13. 1  29.9 
- - - - 6.7  22.2  20.0  -
11.0  5.3  7.5  46.4  22.0  59.9  66. 1  55.6 
6.0  1.0  2.6  57.9  15.9  47.1  51.1  74.5 
·----------------·  - --- - - - - - - -----· -·-
4.6  1.4  2.8  35.8  12. 1  29.8  34.8 
TABLE  9.  Provortion of err.oZouees  workina  vart-time~ 
by  sex and  a~e 1  1983. 
Source  Eurostat,  Emploi  et ChOmage,  2,  1985. -49-
Gross  Proportion of  Adjusted  Unemployment  Participation  Part-time  Participation 
Rate  Employees  Rate  Rate 
{1)  (2)  (3)  {4) 
Belgium  25.7  16.7  23.3  10.9 
Denmark  38.2  46.3  28.6  8.9 
France  33.0  17.8  29.9  6.1 
Germany  29.5  28.3  25.2  3.8 
Ireland  18.6  18.9  16.7  7.4 
Italy  19.9  11.9  18.7  7.0 
Luxemburg  22.4  14.4  20.8  1.5 
Netherlands  17.6  28.3  15.0  3.3 
U.K.  34.7  40.8  27.3  4.4 
r---------------------------------------
Europe  9  28.5  26.4  24.5  5.3 
Mean  Absolute 
Deviation  6.63  10.04  4.55 
(Unweighted) 
TABLE  10.  Adjusted labour-force participation  rates~  women~  19?? 
Definition  (3)  =  (I) [I  - .5 (2) {I  +  ~6~}] 
Source  Eurostat,  "Labour  Force  Sample  Survey",  Emploi  et  Ch.Omage,  2, 
1985. s
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Age_  Married  Unmarried 
14-19  17.2  4. 1 
20-24  19.3  4.3 
25-34  51 .5  14.9 
35-44  57.5  20.7 
45-54  48.0  21.5 
55-59  49.4  33.3 
60-64  64.7  50.0 
65  up  80.2  70.5 
Total  50.2  2 1. I 
TABLE  12.  Proportion of employees  working  part-time~ 
by marital status and  ageJ  U.K.J  1977Lwomen. 
Source  J.P.  Jallade  (ed.),  L'Europe  d  temps  partiel~  Paris,  Economica, 
19 82'  p.  132. 
Age  of  Married  Unmarried  Youngest  Child 
0-4  78  49 
5-9  70  52 
10-15  56  35 
16  up  52  34 
no  dependent  31  6  child 
TABLE  13.  Proportion of women  aged  16-59  working  part-time,  by 
marital status and age of youngest  child~  U.K.~  1977. 
Source  J.P.  Jallade  (ed.),  L'Europe  d  temps  partiel, Paris,  Economica, 
1982,  p.  149. -52-
Preferred length of 
~fen  Women  working  week,  hours 
less  than  20  0.9  1. 3 
20-24  1. 2  9.3 
25-29  1. 7  7.5 
30-34  10. 1  20.6 
35-39  47.3  37.7 
40  up  38.8  23.6 
100.0  100.0 
I 
TABLE  14.  Preferences about working hours  expressed 
by  s~le survey respondents3  Germany~  1978. 
Source  J.P.  Jallade  (ed.},  L'Europe a temps  partieZ,  Paris,  Economica, 
1982,  p.  76. -53-
Average  proportion of active  Economywide  Industry 
women  working part-time  38  sectors  23  sectors 
unweighted  1975  . 107  .077 
1980  . 120  .093 
1983  .140  . 104 
weighted by I  1975  . 154  .078 
current  1980  . 162  .086 
employment  1983  .200  . 113 
weighted by  I 
1980  . 161  .081 
1975  employment  1983  . 197  . 107 
weighted  by  I 
1983  .198  . 112 
1980  employment 
standard  deviation  1975  .067  .057 
of  sectoral  1980  .079  .082 
proportions  1983  .076  .064 
TABLE  15.  Role of sectoPal  distPibution  in growth 
of part-time work3  France3  1975-1983 
Source  Calculations based  on  INSEE,  Enquetes  sur  l'Emploi. 
Services 
14  sectors 
.144 
. 152 
• 184 
.163 
.173 
.209 
. 174 
.209 
.208 
.039 
.043 
.042 -54-
M  E  N  ~~  0  M  E  N 
Industry  Services  Total*  Industry  Services  Total  * 
Belgium  1.0  2.7  2.0  9.0  22.3  I9.7 
Denmark  3.5  9.0  6.6  33.3  47.5  44.7 
France  I.  2  3. I  2.5  11.3  20.9  20.0 
Germany  0.7  2.0  1.7  6.2  31.9  30.0 
Greece  4.4  2. I  3.7  8.4  12. I  I2. 1 
Ireland  1.8  3.0  2.7  7.5  14.6  I5.6 
Italy  1. 4  1.8  2.4  6.0  8.0  9.4 
Luxemburg  - (I. 2)  (I.  2)  (12.I)  17.5  I8.0 
Netherlands  3.0  9.5  6.9  38.9  51.3  50.3 
U.K.  1.3  5. I  3.3  26. I  46.0  42. I 
r-·------------------·----------------- --~---
Europe  IO  1.3  3.4  2.8  18.0  30.3 
TABLE  16.  fercentage of part-time  employed persons  among 
all employed  persons~  by  sex and  sector~  1983. 
Source  Eurostat,  Emploi  et  ChOmage,  2,  1985. 
*Includes Agriculture 
27.6 -55-
JOB  QUALIFICATIO~ 
I  II  III 
Industry 
Full-time workers  6.5  41.8  51.5 
Part-time workers  5.6  38.5  55.8 
Total  6.3  41.2  52.3 
Services  (Trade,  Banks 
and  Insurance) 
Full-time workers  11.9  20.7  67.3 
Part-time workers  5.3  12.5  82.0 
Total  8. 1  15.9  75.7 
TABLE  17.  Distribution of blue-collar women 
by  job qualifieation3  Germanyl  1978 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Source  J.P.  Jallade  (ed.),  L'Europe  a temps  partiel, Paris,  Economica, 
1982,  p.  120. 
Job  qualification 
I  Highly specialised  jobs with  genuine  responsibility 
II  Skilled worker  jobs 
III  Unskilled worker  jobs -56-
Educational  group :  Percentage of women  in 
given educational  group 
working 
Percentage  of  given educa-
tional  group  among  all women 
working  Highest  degree 
received 
University 
Non-University 
higher education 
High  School  : 
complete 
incomplete 
2  years 
No  degree 
Total 
full-time  part-time  full-time 
8I.7  I8.3  4.5 
70.0  30.0  I0.7 
82.8  I7.2  4. I 
69.2  30.8  I5. 3 
62.7  37.3  I2.6 
53.5  46.5  52.8 
-- -- --
60.0  40.0  IOO 
TABLE  18.  Distribution of female  employees 
by  education,  U.K.)  19?8 
part-time 
1.5 
6.9 
1.3 
I0.2 
II • 3 
68.8 
--
IOO 
Source  J.P.  Jallade  (ed.),  £'Europe a temps  partiel,  Paris,  Economica, 
1982,  p.  142. -57-
Average  weekly hours  Average  hourly earnings  (£) 
full-time  part-time  full-time  part-time  Ratio 
Food  and  Beverages  38. 1  21.7  1. 21  1.08  .89 
Electrical Appliances  38.5  22.4  1.23  1. 17  .96 
Textiles  38.3  22.8  1.08  1.02  . 94 
Garments  - Shoes  37.9  24.8  1.02  0.98  .96 
Transport - 37.2  21.1  1.45  1. 16  .80  Communication 
Retail  Trade  37.9  20.9  1.03  0.91  .88 
Banks  - Insurance  35.4  20.0  1.38  1. 13  .82 
Professional  services  35.3  19.5  1.66  1. 21  .73 
Other  services  37.9  20.8  1. 17  0.98  .84 
Pu-blic  servants  37.0  19.8  1.47  1. 19  . 81 
1-- - - - ------1-----------r---·------------
Total  36.8  20.4  1. 37  1.09  .80 
~- -·----------------------r-----------------
Whole  economy  36.9  20.6  1.34 
TABLE  19.  EaPnings  of fema Z.e  emp Z.oyees, 
U.K.J  19?? 
1.09 
Source  J.P.  Jallade  (ed.),  L'Europe a temps  partieZ.,  Paris,  Economica, 
1982,  p.  139 
.81 -58-
Industry  Services 
0  6.7  7. 1 
1-14  12.5  23. 1 
15-19  36.7  35.0 
20-24  11 •  9  11.6 
25-29  23.2  16,6 
30-34  3.7  2.6 
35  up  5.J  4.0 
100.0  100.0 
TABLE  20.  Distribution of hoUPs  worked bu  women 
employees with regular part-time jobs, 
EUPope  9,  1981. 
Source  Eurostat,  "Labour Force  Sample  Survey",  ErrrpZoi  et Chomage, 
2,  1985. 2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
-59-
FOOTNOTES 
It may  also help  those familiar with my  earlier work  in this area to assess 
quickly how  my  thinking has  evolved;  see Dreze  and  Modigliani  (1981),  Dreze 
(1979,  1980). 
Chapters  2  and  3  of Okun  (1981)  also provide  an excellent background  reference 
for  the whole  paper. 
The  standard reference  on  "firm-specific human  capital" is Becker  (1964);  see 
also Hart  (1984  b). 
There  are of course offsetting disadvantages,  including thoseimplied by  the first 
part of Section 2.3. 
See  also Hart  (1984b),or Holt et al.  (1960)  for  an early application at the firm 
level. 
See  Section 4.1 below. 
See  also the  Appendix. 
See  Phlips  (1978). 
These  remarks  apply to new  contracts.  Reducing  severance  ri~hts of  employed 
workers  is not  apt  to  promote  their  employment. 
10 •  Violation of this  condition is  a  major  drawback  of  the otherwise  attractive profit-
sharing  scheme  advocated by Weitzman  (1984).  Firm-specific risks  should  not  matter 
to holders  of diversified portfolios.  That  argument  does  not apply  to privately 
owned  firms,  however. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
This  statement applies  to new  hirings;  the retention rate of workers  under  contract 
will be  enhanced  by wage  cuts  in firms  facing bankruptcy;  again,  these  firms  can 
be  numerous  in a  deep  recession- see  for  instance Dreze  and  Sneessens  (1985). 
That  seniority bonuses  are more  significant  for white  collars  than for blue collars 
is consistent with this observation. 
See  however  Abowd  and Ashenfelter  (1981). 
See  however  the  sample  information about  Belgian and  French  firms  mentioned  in 
Section 9.2. 15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
-60-
Sections  4.3  and  4.4 reflect work  in  (slow)  progress  on  "Labour contracts with 
overlapping generations". 
Some  known  private labour contracts stipulate that  the more  senior workers  are 
laid off last, whereas  other such contracts stipulate that  they  are laid off first 
- see Feldstein  (1976). 
Another  problem &rising with this  forward  contracting is the difficulty for  the 
firm of collectmgan insurance premium before  the  contingency. 
Let  s{w)  and  d(w)  denote  respectively the  supply and  the demand  for  new  contracts 
at the wage  level w.  Assume  that,  when  demand  exceeds  supply,the probability of 
finding  a  job  is well  approximate  by:~=~· The  expected utility of a  worker is  then 
_  s(w)  [  e  u1 
.u 
- d(w)  u  (w)  - u  +  u  , 
e  u  •  ·  .  where  u  (w)  and  u  denote  the util1ty level if employed  and  1£  unemployed 
respectively.  Then,denoting derivatives  by subscripts: 
e  u 
s { (  )  u  (w)-u  +  e  } 
=  d  ns.w- nd.w  "w  uw 
e  u 
> 0  if and  only u  (w)-u  <  w 
ue  nd;w-ns.w 
w 
ue(w)-uu 
a  condition that will hold  whenever--~~--
e  u 
w 
is small  enough. 
The  most  fashionable  of  these  drawbacks,  namely  the negative  impact  on  job  search, 
is  of little consequence  during a  deep recession,  when  employment  is only very 
weakly  linked  to  labour  supply.  The  possible  impact  on wages  is a  more  serious 
matter· 
In  the  case of new  entrants  into  the  labour  force,  or workers  dismissed  from bank-
rupt or closed-down firms,  there is no  scope  for  chargin~ part of  the  cost to  the 
employer,  for  instance  through  experience-rated contributions. 21 
22 
23 
25 
26 
2B 
29 
30 
31 
-61-
Could  such  trading be organised  through markets1  In exceptional cases,  some-
thing resembling a  private market  for  individual  jobs exists; but closer scrutiny 
reveals  that the ·"jobs"  in question are in the nature of  independent practice or 
casual  jobs,  and  lack the dimension of  a  lasting employment  relationship.  For 
regular  jobs,  the presence of a  third party,  the  employer,  complicates  the· trading: 
the  employer must  accept  (recruit)  the  "buyer" of a  job;  and if jobs  in a  firm had 
positive market values,  this might provide incentives  for  the  fi"rm  to  reduce wages 
and  capture  the  "rent.". I  am  not  aware  of serious work  on this  topic.  It should 
also be  realised that our complex  social. legislation does  not facilitate market 
trading of individual jobs.Would a  seller be eligible for unemployment  compensation? 
Would  a  buyer inherit the seniority rights of the seller? Basically,  social security 
rights  are not  transferable. 
The  relevant preferences  concern the trade-off between  the  age  of  retirement  and  the 
level of  the pension,  for  instance. 
According  to  a  survey conducted  in.France in 1980,  50%  of  the workers  would  have 
retired at age  60  instead of  65,  if offered  the  same  retirement  income.  In the Nether-
lands,  when  older teachers were  given the option of reduced working  time  in pre-retire-
ment  years,  90  % of  those eligible took advantage of the scheme. 
In a  sample of  34  firms  surveyed  in 1984  by a  Commission of  the French  Planning Office, 
27  firms  had adopted  some  form  of work  sharing or of working  time  reduction,  but only 
one  case of progressive  (part-time)  retirement was  mentioned;  see Commissariat  ~eneral 
du  plan  (1985). 
OECD  (1985  p.  201),  quoting  Dou~las  (1934). 
Collectin~ microdata  on  employment  chanr.es  in individual  firms  and  analysin~ these 
should be both feasible  and  instructive. 
They  are discussed at greater length in Dreze  (1980),  where  an  attempt is also made  at 
quantifying their implications. 
Rosen  (1985,  Section V)  outlines  a  simple model  of "returns  to hours"  in a  contracts 
framework,  where  firms  use  overtime  in good  states,  layoffs with  constant hours  in 
bad  states. 
The  proposal  also  called for "wage  moderation". 
Hart  (1984),  p.  80. 
Quatrieme  Congres  des  Economistes  Bel~es de  langue  fran~aise  (1980)  and  Commissariat 
General  du  Plan  (1985). -~-
32  Firms  operating on  a  continuous basis typically operate 5  (sometimes  even 6)  shifts 
of variable size. 
33  Cfr.  e.g.  Palasthy  (1978),  Van  den Broeck et al.  (1984). 
34  I  know  of one  industrial  firm which has  adopted  the  scheme  a  few  years  ago  to  expand 
capacity by  35  %without new  investment or multiple shifts;  and  one  savings bank 
wh~ch has  adopted  the  scheme  to  impose  team work  on  its staff. 
35  The  percentage of active women  working part  L~me in that year was  17.5  %.  Baroin 
asserts  that this number  could  incerase by  70  % (or 12  %)  due  to full  time workers 
switching to part-time work,  and by  50  % (or  9  %)  due  to  inactive women  working 
part time.  This  would  result in 38.5  out of 109  active women  working part time,  i.e. 
35  %or twice  the  initial rate of 17.5  % • 
After completing  this draft,  I  read  a  paper by  A.  Lindbeck  and  D.J.  Snower,  "Explanations 
of  Unemployment",  Qxford Review of Economic  Policy,  1,  2,  1985,  34-59,  which gives 
a  summary  account  of "Insider-Outsider" theories  of unemployment,  as  developed  in 
several unpublished papers by  the  same  authors.  That work  seems  to be directly 
relevant  to  the  contents of Sections 4.3-4.4 of  the  present paper. -63-
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